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knowledge about the limitations the law has brought forward and the measures organisations have
taken to work under this law. Furthermore, the limitations persisting in the Russian civil society will be
discussed by reflecting the empirical findings to previous research and historical trajectories. This thesis
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other adaptation was to close down the organisation and work in the form of a business or an initiative
group, yet keeping the same objectives.
The findings raise new questions about the forms organisations can take in repressive conditions and
about civil society’s limits in general. The findings contribute to an updated overview of the organisations
in St. Petersburg working under the Law on Foreign Agents and raise topical issues for further
discussion and research.
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51. Introduction
In the 21st century, the limiting of civil society actors and closing space for the
third sector are a worldwide and not only a Russian phenomenon. Globally an
increasing number of restrictive legislation is being forced, aimed at critical
voices towards governments. In the past few years, governments have adopted
laws that shrink the administrative and legal space in which non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) work. (Mendelson 2015, 1-2.) Scholars and policy-
makers have generally presumed that civil society (something that is civil) is
crucial for democratic states (McIntosh Sundstom 2002, 209).
The civil society in Russia is undergoing changes, which are affecting its ways
of existing, influencing and functioning. These changes, which have been
mainly enforced through amendments to the legislation, are shaping the
functions of the NGOs. Due to these changes, the third sector in Russia is going
through major alterations and is seeking its own way of working (see e.g.
Ljubownikow et al 2013). Free, enabling and responsive civil society is seen in
this thesis as a value of its own and as a contribution to a well-functioning
society, democracy and country as a whole. The freedom of civil society can
also be seen as an indicator of the ruling elites, as non-democratic
governments tend to repress civil society actors more than democratic
governments for e.g. their watchdog function or oppositional values (see e.g.
Freedom House 2014 indicators). This thesis thus sees these laws adopted by
the Russian government as indicators that put the Russian state in a certain
category. That category creates the framework, environment and preconditions
where the NGOs are working.
This thesis focuses on the Law on Foreign Agents, which was adopted in 2012.
From then on, it has had an impact on the civil society in Russia. Naturally, the
law affects the organisations that become its subjects, but can it be argued that
some one hundred organisations1 have influenced the civil society as a whole?
This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 8, but I would argue that the law
1 On 5th of May 2017 there were 97 organisations on the list of foreign agents out of about 226 000
organisations altogether registered in Russia
6is not about the numbers, but rather the arbitrary atmosphere it creates.
Moreover, the law has raised wide international criticism towards the Russian
legal system and ruling elites. The organisations on the list of foreign agents
(see appendix 1) vary in their location and subjects they work with. The
common factors for these organisations are the “political activity” they are
involved in and the receiving of foreign funding. Political activity is vaguely
defined 2  and related to for instance attempts to influence public opinion
(including e.g. research and holding public gatherings), encouraging citizens to
critical thinking towards government policy and influencing the development of
state policy. The government has also made it difficult for independent NGOs to
seek foreign funding, even when the Russian government grants are hard to
obtain. This has crated serious obstacles to independent NGOs working in
Russia. (Amnesty International 2016, 33.)
Civil society is closely connected to the concept of rule of law, presupposing the
existence of an independent judicial system that can fairly administer the
legislation. The rule of law provides the framework for solving conflicts between
members of civil society, and the state must also obey the law. However, the
rule of law is exceptionally weak in Russia and the state is able to exercise
strong influence over most social actors. (Rutland 2006, 74-75.)
In this thesis, the Law on Foreign Agents defines the group of actors for
analysis. The analysis is limited to one city, St. Petersburg and the empirical
data was collected by interviewing experts from nine different NGOs, which
have been effected by the law on foreign agents. This group of actors has
attracted extensive international attention and brought forward criticism towards
2Definition of political activity by the Ministry of Justice: Federal Law № 179-FZ: "A non-profit
organization, with the exception of political parties, shall be considered engaging in political activity in
the territory of the Russian Federation if notwithstanding the goals and objectives stated in its founding
documents, it carries out activities in spheres such as statebuilding; protecting the foundations of the
constitutional system of the Russian Federation, its federal structure, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
promoting law and order, national security and public safety; national defense and foreign policy;
economic, social and national development of the Russian Federation and the development of its political
system; operation of government authorities and local self-government bodies; and legal regulation of
individual rights and liberties—with the aim of influencing public policy elaboration and implementation,
formation of government and local self-government bodies, their decisions and actions. The above
activities can take the following forms: participation in organizing and conducting public events such as
meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches or pickets or various combinations of these forms; organizing
and conducting public debates, discussions, talks; participation in activities aimed at obtaining a specific
7the measures taken by the Russian authorities. There are numerous reports,
international seminars, news articles and research about the law on foreign
agents, even though it portrays only a fraction of the whole Russian civil society.
The question can (and will) be raised, of why is this so?
The views differ greatly from the side of the Russian officials and from the side
of the civil society on what is the sole purpose of the Law on Foreign Agents.
From the side of the Russian authorities, the justification for this law is that it
was adopted to increase transparency in organisations, which receive foreign
funding. From the side of international organisations (e.g. Transparency
International, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International) the criticism
mainly relates to the law admitting of several interpretations and not contributing
to transparency, but rather to the defamation of the work of the NGOs.
1.1 Relevance and aims
This thesis contributes to the discussion on Russian civil society through the
Law on Foreign Agents. It wishes to bring forward new findings and raise topical
questions concerning the state-society relations in Russia and the possible
future directions of the third sector working under repressive legislation.
To understand experience, the experience is located within, and cannot be
extracted from the larger events in a social, political, cultural, racial, gender-
related, informational and technological framework and therefore these are
essential aspects for analysis (Corbin & Strauss 2008, 8). The focus of this
thesis will be mainly on the social, political, and to add, legislative and historical
events. The social science approach sees legal experience as variable and
contextual and it should not be simplified into too easy conceptions. Nonet and
Selznick (2001, 93) suggest, that instead of talking about necessary connections
between law and coercion, law and the state, law and rules and law and moral
aspiration, it should be considered to what extent and under what conditions
these connections occur.
3 Originally published in 1978
8The principal aim of this thesis is to discuss the persistent limitations for the
work of the organisations as well as the new limitations and emergent
adaptations the Law on Foreign Agents has brought forward. These issues will
be discussed in the frameworks of previous research and the developmental
perspective. Through these discussions, this thesis wishes to produce tangible
points on the past and recent developments and briefly deliberate upon
possible future directions.
Ljubownikow and Crotty (2014) have produced a similar research4 on health
and education NGOs and their responses to legislative changes. In their paper,
Ljubownikow and Crotty acknowledge the limitations of their study and note that
in future research on the Russian NGO sphere, a larger sample, different
methodological approach, different sectors and regions could be addressed.
They note that perhaps their article will provide a stimulus for other researchers
to examine the developments of Russian civil society since 2006. (Ljubownikow
and Crotty 2014, 771.) This thesis provides its input to answer to the responses
of a different sector, the “politically oriented”5 sector. None of the organisations
interviewed for this thesis were working on the health and education sector, but
had their focus on advocacy instead of service provision. In this thesis,
advocacy work refers to issues such as the promotion of human rights, freedom
of media or information and universal values in general, and the attempt to
promote these values in society. Flikke (2016)6 has also contributed to new
research done about the Law on Foreign Agents. However, Flikke does not
solely focus on the Law on Foreign Agents, but takes into account the Law On
Public Control (2014) and its effects. Hence, previous research relating to the
Law on Foreign Agents has been made, but not with the focus on the city St.
Petersburg and with a focus on the responses of the targeted organisations.
Having access to previous research with a similar focus is an asset for this
4 Civil Society in a Transitional Context: The Response of Health and Educational NGOs to Legislative
Changes in Russia’s Industrialized Regions, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43:4, 759-776.
5 The other criteria, in addition to foreign funding, to be listed as a foreign agent is the organisation’s
“political activity”, hence the organisations studied in this thesis can be categorised as “politically
oriented” or “advocacy oriented”. This division is further discussed in Chapter 3.6.
6 Resurgent Authoritarianism: The Case of Russia's New NGO Legislation. Post-Soviet Affairs, 32:2,
103-131.
9thesis, since it provides a baseline to reflect the empirical findings of this thesis
upon.
1.2 Introduction to theory, research questions, framework and data
Max Weber argued that to understand law sociologically, we need to observe
the patterns of action and appreciate the subjective meaning of the actors
involved in the action. Following this thought, Weber notes that the “content” of
any moral judgement is fully revealed only in understanding the context of the
social network and determinations of the actual social-historic situation.
Morrison adds, that we therefore need to consider a duality; the internality of
action and the situation of that action within the vast picture of social
development. (Morrison 1997, 283.)
The attempt to make sense of institutional history seems to require an
understanding about direction, growth and decay (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 19).
This thesis seeks to analyse the consequences of the law on foreign agents has
brought upon the organisations which have become its subjects. Henry and
McIntosh Sundstrom (2006) note, that when applying a concept, which is
developed in the West to a non-Western context, the researcher should take
note of the customary practises and types of cooperation that are common in
that environment. (Henry & McIntosh Sundstrom 2006, 325.) This seems to be
a recurrent theme in studies about Russia done in a Western scholarly tradition.
This is especially noted in the ideas presented by Ljubownikow, Crotty and
Rodgers (2013), when they present the concept of civil society po-russki [in
Russian]. This concept will be discussed more in Chapter 3.4.
The term foreign agent in the context of Russia studies calls for attention to the
history of the Soviet Union. It has been suggested that the dualistic distinction
between good and evil was, and still is unique to Russian thought (Lotman &
Uspenskij 1984, 4). It also has been suggested that the conflict between good
and evil is one of the major bases of Russian political thought. The East and the
West – not only in geographical but mainly in political and religious senses –
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can be seen to be presented by Russian thinkers, writers, politicians, and
religious leaders as two contending forces throughout Russian and Soviet
cultural history. This contention is represented as a struggle between good and
evil nations, and between good Russian and corrupted Western values.
(Pesonen 1991.) The West, Western Europe, and the United States have been
perceived to represent wrong and dangerous forces and values as well as a
danger and a threat to Russia, Russian people, its religion, values and politics.
(Harle 2000, 106.) Acknowledging this background, the wording in the Law on
Foreign Agents brings forth questions on the possible insinuations it could
pursue and justifies the criticism brought forward by international human rights
organisations (e.g. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) that the title of
the law smears the organisations that work under it. This issues is further
discussed in Chapters 3.7 and 6.5.
The decision to collect the data myself became obvious when in summer 2015 I
was working as an intern in a research centre in St. Petersburg. This centre was
one of the NGOs, which was listed as a foreign agent. I had read and followed
the developments on the Law on Foreign Agents and I became interested in
hearing about the experiences directly from the people who were working under
this law. The empirical data for this thesis was collected between June 2015
and January 2016. The interviews were conducted in St. Petersburg with nine
experts of nine different NGOs, which were affected by the law on foreign
agents. The interviews were transcribed and produced altogether 79 pages of
material for analysis.
This thesis makes the following presumptions based on literature on the topic
and previous research: the civil society in Russia can be described as weak
(see e.g. Howard 2003), the courts and legal institutions are not independent
from politics (see e.g. Kozyreva & Smirnov 2015) and the division of “East” and
“West” (good vs. evil) is still strong in Russian political thought (see e.g. Harle
2000). When researching a topical phenomenon in Russia, one needs to take
into account the Soviet legacy. This puts the research on Russian civil society in
its own framework and defines the main issues to consider when analysing
especially the persistent limitations. Many scholars account the weakness of the
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civil society to the Soviet heritage (see e.g. Uhlin 2006) and this issue is
discussed more in Chapter 3.4. The other presumption about the
interdependence of the courts and the political system place Russia in this
thesis in the category of repressive law, a term created by Nonet & Selznick
(2001). This decision is further discussed in Chapter 4. The division of “East”
and “West” contributes to the thinking of the wording of the Law on Foreign
Agents.
Hence, the research questions this thesis seeks to answer are:
1. What are the expedients the organisations affected by the law on foreign
agents have taken to work under this legislation?
2. How do the organisations listed as foreign agents describe their work and
work environment and do these descriptions differ from or relate to previous
research?
3. What potentials for change can be identified for the NGOs working under the
Law on Foreign Agents based on the theory related to the developmental model
by Nonet & Selznick?
The first two research questions are discussed based on previous research.
The first question contributes to the understanding of emergent adaptations and
the second to the persistent and new limitations. The third question is analysed
using a developmental model of different legal orders created by Nonet &
Selznick (2001). This model (see appendix 2) draws from the developmental
model of bureaucracy (see appendix 3). Nonet and Selznick use the discussion
about the stages of bureaucracy in social science to make the point that under
appropriate conditions, specific processes emerge that tend to transform ad hoc
pre-bureaucratic decision making into more systematic bureaucratic decision-
making. They argue that if this model is seen appropriate to describe different
societies through their bureaucratic structures, why should legal systems not act
as similar indicators for types of societies. (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 21-23.)
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The structure of the thesis proceeds as follows: after the introductory chapter,
Chapter 2 will discuss the Law on Foreign Agents and other main developments
in the legislation on NGOs in Russia. Chapter 3 will contribute to understanding
about the environment and historical background where the NGOs are working.
This chapter sets the thesis into its place, time and definition to better analyse
the current events. Chapters 4 and 5 will focus on theory, methods for the
research and methods for the interviews. Chapter 6 will introduce the findings
from the data and chapters 7 and 8 discuss and conclude these findings.
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2. NGO legislation in Russia
This chapter introduces the main changes to the legislation, which have
affected the third sector in Russia, with the focus on the Law on Foreign
Agents. As Flikke (2016) notes, the amendments to the legislation relating to
NGOs have created unstable conditions for the organisations. These
amendments press their independence by means of threats of dissolution and
by reducing the quality of civil society influence over state organs. (Flikke 2016,
103.)
2.1 Main NGO legislations
The start of the trend of demobilising certain organisations while mobilising
others can be dated back to the year 2004. A new type of rhetoric started to
emerge and key officials started referring to certain organisations as
“unpatriotic” (Gilbert 2016, 1556). In 2004, Putin stated in his annual “State of
the Nation” speech that NGOs receiving foreign funding follow the agendas of
foreign donors (Putin 2004). The 2006 “Spy rock scandal”7 was also used as an
example of questioning the patriotism of foreign funded groups (Elder 2012).
The major changes in the Russian legislation concerning NGOs began in
January 2006 when the Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative
Acts of the Russian Federation was enacted. This law e.g. introduced
burdensome and elusive reporting requirements for NGOs. In addition,
penalties for non-compliance, bureaucratic registration procedures, and new
broad powers to the registration bodies to monitor the activities of NGOs were
applied. Moreover, the legislation leaves room for government officials to
interpret the law in arbitrary ways and to determine when to enforce the rules
(INCL 2015). Robertson (2011) agrees with the previous statement that the
2006 law on NGOs is written in a way that it provides an ambiguous legislative
platform, which can be used selectively to monitor possible threats from the
NGOs and their possible foreign sponsors. The Russian elite sees monitoring of
7 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16614209
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foreign funding to Russia as a central element in preventing the so-called
"Colour Revolutions"8. (Robertson 2011, 540-541.)
Other laws, which have affected the work of NGOs in Russia include: the 2012
law, which increased existing fines for violating rules of participating in and
organising of public protests; the 2012 law of introducing defamation as a
criminal offence and the 2012 law of expanding the definition of treason, which
enables the government to determine criticism towards the state as
traitorousness. (ICNL 2017.)
Furthermore, the Federal Law 129-FZ “On Amendments of Some Legislative
Acts of the Russian Federation”, or more commonly referred as the Law on
Undesirable Organisations has contributed to narrowing the sphere of influence
for civil society in Russia. This law allows the Prosecutor General or the
Prosecutor General’s deputies to declare international and foreign organisations
“undesirable” due to their “threat to national security”. Currently this list includes
National Endowment for Democracy, The George Soros’ Open Society
Foundation, National Democratic Institute, U.S. Russia Foundation for
Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law, National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, Media Development Investment Fund Inc. and
International Republican Institute. The maximum penalty for Russian officials or
organisations participating in activities with “undesirable” organisations can be
up to six year in prison and the deprivation of rights to engage in civic activities
for ten years. (ICNL 2017.)
2.2 NGOs carrying out functions of a foreign agent
The Law 121-FZ “Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial
Organizations Performing the Function of Foreign Agents” is the amendment to
the existing legislation, which is the focus of this thesis. The Law No. 121-FZ
8 A term used mainly in the post-Soviet context to describe a sequence of protest that succeed in
overthrowing authoritarian regimes
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(hereafter the Law on Foreign Agents) is not a single entity itself, but an
amendment to the existing legislation.
The Law on Foreign Agents was signed by President Putin on July 20th 2012.
The law requires Russian organisations, which receive foreign funding and take
part in “political activity” to register on the list of foreign agents. (HRW 2013,
12.) The Law on Foreign Agents was initiated through an internet petition, which
was a part of a new proposal by Putin to promote “democracy and the quality of
the state”. This platform allowed Russian citizens to propose new laws through
petitions. Putin suggested that petitions, which receive more than 100 000
signatures should be processed in the State Duma. Associated with this
proposal, there was an internet campaign carrying the slogan “you have a right
to know” encouraging people to support this proposal. This campaign
demanded rights for citizens to have control over and to be aware of influences
on their opinion. The campaign made clear that the US has paid 200 million
dollars to support NGOs in Russia. Flikke mentions, that Russian sociologist
see this campaign as a shift from paternalism to a discourse of actually
“combatting the enemy” and as a rally targeted against the whole of the third
sector. (Flikke 2016, 110.) United Russia Deputy Alexander Sidyakin, who
initiated the Law on Foreign Agents, stated that the law does not aim at
“prohibiting or restricting activities or undermining the rights of nongovernmental
organizations, but rather at helping to ensure transparency for those who act as
foreign agents, to make that information clear for Russian citizens”. Other Duma
Deputies from United Russia said the law was aimed at controlling “foreign
interference” in the affairs of Russia. (Human Rights Watch 2013, 12-13.) In
April 2014, the Constitutional Court of Russia ruled that the Law on Foreign
Agents does not contradict the Russian constitution and that labelling NGOs as
foreign agents is aimed at “important public interests”. (ICNL 2015.) Legal
experts in Russia and abroad criticized the law’s overly broad opportunities for
interpretation, how rapidly it was adopted and the additional burdens it imposed
on NGOs. It was also condemned by most of leading human rights groups of
Russia as part of an effort to stain advocacy groups as “spies” or “hidden
enemies.” (Human Rights Watch 2013, 12-13.) Hence, as Sakwa (2015, 202)
argues, these laws can be seen to have directly political aims.
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Based on the listing by the Human Rights Watch (2015) (see appendix 1) the
organisations based in St. Petersburg (and in Russia in general), which have
been affected by the Law on Foreign Agents mainly work in the fields of human
rights, freedom of expression, the freedom of information and research. The
statuses of the organisations are in a constant flux, thus it is challenging to
provide an up-to-date list of the organisations, which are listed as foreign
agents. The list can be misleading, since even if the organisation has officially
closed down, it might be functioning through a different administrative body.
Currently, there are altogether 97 organisations on the list of foreign agents in
Russia, of which nine are from St. Petersburg (Russian Ministry of Justice
20.4.2017).
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3. Civil society in Russia – Previous research on the topic
This chapter aims at defining the most central concepts and contributions to the
discussion on the definition of civil society in general and civil society in a post-
Soviet context. Chapter 3.1 will provide an outline on the definition of civil
society in this thesis; Chapter 3.2 will introduce the case of St. Petersburg and
illustrate the decision why the data was collected solely in this city; Chapter 3.3
will provide a brief overview of the history of the civil society in the Soviet Union
and in Russia; Chapter 3.4 will focus on the specific traits of civil society in
Russia; Chapters 3.5 and 3.6 focus on the state-society relations in Russia.
Concluding this part, Chapter 3.7 will present and discuss two surveys, which
reflect the common opinion of the Russian people about the civil society and
NGOs.
3.1 Definition of civil society
One of the classic definitions of civil society is based on the Tocquevillian9 idea
of freedom of association (see e.g. Foley & Edwards 1996) making civil society
an arena situated between the state, the markets and the individual (Cohen &
Arato 1992). Leading scholar in democracy studies Larry Diamond defines civil
society as the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, at
least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by legal
order or a set of shared rules and involves citizens acting collectively in a public
sphere (Diamond 1999, 221). Diamond also notes that one of the civil society’s
functions is to “limit the power of the state” (ibid. 239). The definition of civil
society is an on-going debate and there is no common view on the
comprehensive or unambiguous definition. In this thesis, Anders Uhlin’s (2006)
definition of civil society is seen as appropriate. Uhlin states that civil society
requires a public space independent of the exercise of state power and the
ability of organising within it to influence the exercise of state power (Uhlin
2006, 23). According to Uhlin, civil society should be firstly seen as an arena or
a social sphere in addition to other arenas such as the state, political society
9 Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) Democracy in America.
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and economic society. Second, it should be stressed that the state and civil
society are highly connected and interdependent, meaning that civil society
cannot completely be autonomous from the state. It is possible to make an
analytical distinction between the state arena and the civil society arena, but
often it is the overlapping of, and connections between these two spheres that
are the most fruitful to analyse. Third, civil society is a public sphere. Fourth civil
society actors are typically collectively organised around specific common
interests. Fifth, both political and apolitical actors may act within civil society.
(Uhlin 2006, 23-24.)
The definition of a non-governmental organisation was established by the UN in
1945. The definition to be an accepted NGO by the UN consist of all types of
private bodies who are independent of government control, not seeking to
challenge governments by presenting as a political party, nor by having a
narrow focus on human rights, not working for profit and not involved in criminal
activity. (UN 1945, chapter x article 71).
3.2 NGOs in St. Petersburg
The aim of this thesis is not to produce information applicable to Russia as a
whole, but to observe a specific area, which is St. Petersburg. A conventional
view on Russia is to see it as a single entity. Russia is commonly portrayed
from a federal level, or divided into smaller groups mainly based on
geographical factors (Zubarevich 2012, 1-2). Russian Federation consists of 83
regions. Each of these regions has one of the following statuses: oblast (46),
krai (9), city of federal significance (2), republic (21), autonomous okrug (4) or
autonomous oblast (1). There are two cities of federal significance, St.
Petersburg and Moscow. (Reisinger 2013, xxii.). Zubarevich (2012) has divided
Russia into “four Russias” – Land of post-industrial cities, blue-collar workers,
rural and semi-urban populations and under-developed Russia. St. Petersburg,
amongst Moscow and Yekaterinburg is categorised in the first group of land of
post-industrial cities. (Zubarevich 2012, 1-2.)
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The enormous regional differences in Russia are the reason why this thesis is
considered a case study. The situation in St. Petersburg can be discussed in
different contexts, but it needs to be seen as its own entity. Leah Gilbert (2016)
notes, that scholarships have shown that St Petersburg and Moscow, while
remaining the most influential cities in Russia, should not be seen as
representative of Russia as a whole. (Gilbert 2016, 1154).
NGOs in St. Petersburg tend to be more independent compared to NGOs in
small town Russia, where they are more often controlled by the state. There are
different estimates of the number of NGOs operating in St. Petersburg. The city
administration suggests that around 8 000 NGOs are registered, but estimate
that 1 000 are active. Another representative from the city administration says
there are more than 5 000 NGOs registered. A leading figure suggests that
there were 3 800 NGOs in 1994, but by 2001, the number had increased to
about 11 000. From these 11 000, about a quarter are active. (Uhlin 2006, 77.)
In North-west part of Russia, (which includes also St. Petersburg) the amount of
NGOs was approximately 23 713 in 2015. Out of these NGOs, 39% were
registered in St. Petersburg which makes it approximately 14 460 NGOs
registered in St. Petersburg. (Aventica 2015, 248.)
Although as mentioned earlier, the focus on this thesis is on St. Petersburg, the
following chapter briefly discusses the history on civil society in Russia. This is
because the influence of the Soviet period on contemporary civil society in
Russia is a repeated theme in research on the topic (e.g. Howard 2002, Uhlin
2006).
3.3 Brief history of civil society in Russia
Based on previous literature the main influence of the Russian civil society in
the 21st century lies in the Soviet era. The socialist regime has left its imprint on
the attitudes of the public, ruling elite and national institutions. Before the
October revolution in 1917, Russia did not have a mentionable civil society.
(Uhlin 2006, 42.) There are some contradicting views to the status of civil
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society in Tsarist Russia. For example, Schaeffer Conroy suggests, that before
1917 there was a small but active civil movement in Russia (Schaeffer Conroy
2006, 12). However, as Alapuro (2008) mentions, even though already before
1917 the elites were suppressing society’s own means of functioning, the Soviet
era has a bigger influence on the current state of affairs (Alapuro 2008, 32).
With the founding of the Soviet Union in 1922, a political system was created
where almost all individual activities were against the state’s official ideology of
socialism. The goal was to build a model of society where the people were
subjects to the hierarchical system of distribution consisting of material, social
and spiritual goods, administered by the prevailing elites. There was no space
for civil society in the socialist system since free press, opposition, political
parties, and other independent political entities were suppressed by the
government. All non-governmental actions – political, cultural, societal, religious
and social - were under strict constraints. The organisations that were allowed
to function were annexed to the ruling party system. Even though organisations
were called voluntary organisations, they were under strict control from the
state. (Zdravomyslova 2005, 204.) Even all creative organisations such as the
book union, journalists’ union and artists’ union and unpolitical clubs such as
the chess club and philatelic club were subjected to strict control by the ruling
party (Dzhibladze 2005, 172).
The turn of events took place in 1985, when president at the time Mikhail
Gorbachev announced the policy of Perestroika (restruction). It seemed that
political opposition and civic activity free from state control could be made
possible. Socialist pluralism gave room for the idea of civic activity, even though
the first officially formed organisations were quite modest and involved in e.g.
the protection of historical monuments. From the year 1987 more politically
active organisations started appearing, which were involved in the concepts of
democracy and human rights (groups such as Perestroika Club - a discussion
group in Moscow and Memorial - human rights and democracy group were
founded). By the year 1987 there were around 30 000 unofficial groups and by
the year 1989 the number had grown to 60 000, involving millions of citizens to
the work. Most of the groups did not proclaim liberal ideology, but resisted the
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autocracy of the communist party and spoke for legal protection and civic and
political rights. (Uhlin 2006, 44-45.)
During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency in the 1990s, the tentative framework was set
for the freedom of action of non-governmental organisations. The government
recognised rights such as the freedom of speech, rights to publish and freedom
of assembly. On the other hand, from the end of 1980s the government started
preparing restrictive laws due to the high increase in the number of
organisations. In 1991 the Law “On Voluntary Organisations” was passed in the
Duma, which gave voluntary organisations the right to function without
governments assent. Although, the organisations had to register through an
expensive and bureaucratic system. In addition, in 1995 the Law “On Public
Associations” was passed and Laws “On Charitable Activities and Charitable
Organisations” and Law “On Non-commercial Organisation” in 1996. (Jagudina
2009, 103.) The new legislation created a space for voluntary activism, but it
also limited it by creating bureaucratic challenges. The legal framework was
unclear and registering frequently was additional work for activists as well as
costs in registration and lawyer’s fees. (Henderson 2003, 49.)
The number of organisations steadily grew the whole of 1990s and by 2001
there were around 450 000-485 000 officially registered organisations in
Russia. Approximately 60% of these organisations were not connected to the
government or any municipality. The organisations were addressing issues of
societal problems, youth problems, women’s rights, economy, disability and
human rights. In addition, many active organisations were not officially
registered, hence they do not show in the numbers. Even if the number of
organisations may seem large, in reality the number of members was quite low
compared to other countries. (Jagudina 2009, 78-80.) The exception is the
labour movement, to which even now the participation is at a high level. When
the civic movements were changed into official organisations, the number of
participants decreased. The movements registered as non-governmental
organisations, because then it became possible for them to apply for
international funding. Western donors saw the support for NGOs as vital to the
development of democracy and civil society in Russia. (Salmenniemi 2008, 49-
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50). For example, in 1995 85% of the whole foreign civil society support from
the US was given to Russia (Henderson 2003). Recent research shows that the
amount of NGOs in Russia has declined by a third from 2011 onwards. In the
North-West Russia the amount of NGOs has declined by 35% from 2011 to
2015. The amount of NGOs in Russia in total in 2015 was approximately
226 000. (see appendix 5.)
Zdravomyslova (2005) sums up the Soviet & post-Soviet civil society in three
stages:
1. Pre-political stage before 1988 when fighting for civic rights was unofficial
and unpolitical
2. Political phase from 1988 to 1991 when the struggle for human rights and
other free civic actions became a part of the general movement to overrule the
Soviet system
3. Judicial phase from 1991 onwards, when non-governmental organisations
become actors of the developing Russian civil society (Zdravomyslova 2005,
206.)
It can be suggested here that after the last phase described by Zdravomyslova,
from 2001 onwards begun the phase of increased regulations towards the
NGOs, when the state started creating institution to control and create civic
movements “from above”.
3.4 Specific traits for civil society in Russia
The weakness of Russian civil society is a subject repeated in research on the
topic (see e.g. Howard 2002, Howard 2003). Another recurrent theme is the
Soviet heritage, which is presented as one part of the explanation to the
weakness of contemporary Russian civil society (see e.g. Uhlin 2006, Howard
2002; Howard 2003). Howard (2002) has explained the weakness of the
Russian civil society by three main arguments. First, the lack of trust for national
organisations is a clear heritage from the Soviet times. Second, unofficial
networks were developed during the Soviet era and people are used to the idea
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that they are sufficient. Third, people are disappointed in the way Russia has
organised itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Howard 2002, 161-163.)
Social networks can also be seen to play a central role in Russian society (see
e.g. Lonkila 2009; Castrén 2005; Salmi 2006; here Alapuro 2008, 30) and they
have also been suggested to replace the need for the work done by the third
sector (Howard 2003, 107–109). On the other hand, Gibson (2001) argues that
the social ties and trust among those within personal networks are what allow
for the development of civil society in Russia. He sees that generally social
networks appear to be an important source of learning from others and from
experience about the meaning of democratic institutions and processes. Thus
being embedded in social networks with high political capacity is perhaps a
necessary but not a sufficient condition to access democratic ideas. (Gibson
2001, 64.)
There is an ongoing discussion among scholars on whether there is a specific
Russian type of civil society, which differs from the Western models of civil
society. Civil society po-russki is a term by Ljubownikow, Crotty and Rodgers
(2013). They question whether the western models and descriptions of civil
society can be applied to the civil society in Russia. They argue that Russia’s
third sector has been, or is developing its own way of working. They note that
the concept of civil society po-russki shows the need to understand civil society
as a sphere, which is shaped by its context. As a result, civic engagement is
possible within structures and forms, which conflict with a traditional (or
Western) understanding of civil society. In this context the state plays a
substantial and dominant role in defining the boundaries and possibilities for
civil society activities. (Ljubownikow et al 2013, 163.) Hale (2002) on the other
hand criticises the division made by some scholars to “Russian” and “Western”
models of civil society. He sees that this national labelling has a damaging
effect as it ignores the enormous differences within both Russian and Western
scholarly traditions. Hale notes, there is a need to move away from the debate
on whether a real civil society is developing in Russia. (Hale 2002, 306.)
McIntosh Sundstrom and Henry list four key patterns, which they see as
obstacles for the development of a strong and democratic civil society in
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Russia. These patterns include: general reluctance to participate in civic
associations, the weak institutionalisation of Russian NGOs, need for organised
groups to communicate with the state through connections with key individuals
and the role of the state as the dominant actor in the political sphere. (McIntosh
Sundstrom & Henry 2006, 305.)
3.5 State and civil society relations in Russia
The temporal outline for discussing state-society relations in Russia is limited to
Vladimir Putin’s rule from the year 2000 onwards. Vladimir Putin's rule has been
defined by various terms such as ”managed democracy", "virtual democracy",
"stealth authoritarianism" or "monocentrism". According to Evans, the essential
challenge for researchers is to notice the features of the structures Putin seeks
to construct. No evidence exists though that Putin has a detailed plan for
shaping a certain type of political system; Putin has officially denied the idea of
an official state ideology. What can be said is that it is clear that Putin is
determined to strengthen the Russian state and enhance Russia's status as a
central power and that he regards economic growth and internal order as
necessary means to those ends. (Evans 2006, 148.) Sakwa notes, that Putin’s
political order comprises of two sub-systems, which support each other. First,
the regime constantly negotiates with society, meaning that the regime will
retreat when it encounters social resistance. Sakwa uses as an example the
crisis of monetising of social benefits in early 2005, which provoked a large-
scale mobilisation among the citizens. The main goal for the regime is to avoid
political crises. This also applies within the system of policy-making, where
Sakwa sees Putin as the main factional manager whose duty is to ensure that
no specific group can capture the whole spectre of policy options. In other
words, all of the factions get something some of the time, but no one gets
everything all of the time. Second, in order to understand the system an
understanding of the images it creates need to be taken into account. By this
Sakwa refers to e.g. the creation of para-constitutional bodies such as the State
Council or the Public Chamber. The system is one of controlled contestation,
which actually is committed to make Russia a competitive economy and a great
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power at a global level. Putin has created a synthesis of his own, consisting of
elements of Soviet remnants, Russia’s “third way” state-led developmentalism,
statist paternalism and growing cultural critique towards Western modernity and
Western values. (Sakwa 2014, 194-195.)
During Putin's first term it started to become evident that journalists and
environmentalists who were critical towards the government's actions would be
subjected to harassment or even prison sentences. In 2001 a Civic Forum was
organised in Moscow as a platform for organisations and government officials to
interact. The stated purpose of this forum was to "integrate civil society
organisations throughout Russia into a single corporatist body that would allow
them an official consultative role with the government". (Squier 2002, 177.) After
vocal complaints from many social activists, the government backed away from
efforts targeted at the prompt implementation of the plan. Some NGO leaders
refused to take part in the conference but others saw it as an opportunity to
bring their concerns to the attention of the political leadership. Even if the forum
was a setback, it did not stop the attempts of the state to apply legal,
administrative and financial tools to make it gradually more difficult for NGOs to
operate independently of government domination. In addition, a growing
number of GONGOs started appearing 10  among the third sector. (Nikitin &
Buchanan 2002, 149.)
Gilbert (2016) suggests that Putin's policies were enacted for the purpose of
bringing organised groups under greater government oversight and making
them more dependent on the state. According to this view, Putin's policies
backed organisations that are either apolitical or supportive of the regime's
agenda and in turn undermined organisations that are openly critical, pursue
liberal agendas or are funded by foreign donors. (Gilbert 2016, 1154.) The
discussion on the impact of these policies divides scholars. Some scholars have
emphasised how the policies have constrained organisations (Lipman 2005;
Taylor 2011; Crotty et al. 2014) while others such as Javeline and Lidemann-
Komarova (2010) argue, that Putin's policies have facilitated the work of NGOs
10 Government-organised and financed nongovernmental organisations, typically mimicking the functions
of NGOs to promote the interests of the state.
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in Russia. Javeline and Lidemann-Komarova argue that there is no conclusive
evidence of a widespread clampdown on Russian NGOs and suggest that the
effect of the 2006 NGO law has been useful to eradicate corrupt organisations
and has brought greater transparency to their work. (Javeline & Lindemann-
Komarova 2010.) Here needs to be stressed that the law which Javeline &
Lindemann-Komarova are discussing is the 2006 NGO Law "On Introducing
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation (Law
number 18-FZ), not the Law on Foreign Agents.
The Kremlin has also aimed at promoting certain social organisations at the
expense of others, which is the case with the Public Chamber, which was
established in 200511. The goal of this Public Chamber was to promote greater
institutional dialogue between society and government authorities, but it is
mainly designed to answer to the priorities of the regime. One third of its
members is appointed by the president and selects in turn another third of the
Chamber’s membership; the remaining third is selected through conferences in
the seven federal districts. The Chamber can be influential, as it has access to
policy-makers and it oversees grants to social organisations awarded from the
federal budget on a competitive basis. These so-called “presidential grants” for
social projects have so far resulted in allocating 500 million RUB (8 300 000
EUR). The yearly amount is approximately 1,5 million RUB (24 900 EUR), but it
has increased in the past years to around 2,7 million RUB (44 900 EUR) per
annum. (Rustamova 2014.)
3.6 Division of the Russian NGO-sector
Howard notes that the state’s role is crucial in enabling and facilitating a
prosperous civil society. The state plays a key role in passing legislation, which
protects the rights of the organisations, as well as providing incentives for the
NGOs to organise and recruit members. (Howard 2002, 168.)
11 https://www.oprf.ru/en/about/
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A common functional distinction in Russia is to divide the sector into two main
roles: promotion of societal change through advocacy work and social welfare-
oriented support for vulnerable people. Promoting societal change through
advocacy work is seen as political activity and such organisations aim at having
an impact on common issues and defending people's rights and interests. The
social welfare-oriented organisations are mainly connected to a specific groups'
effort to provide social welfare services. (Kulmala 2016, 199-200.) This division
between service-oriented and politically oriented organisations will be briefly
discussed and questioned in the following chapters. When observing the list of
foreign agents (see appendix 1), most of the organisations are pursuing goals
that can be described as politically oriented or advocacy oriented for their aims
at societal change.
Since president Putin was first elected he has pursued a strategy of mobilising
certain groups while demobilising others. State-sponsored mobilisation is best
seen in key organisational spheres such as youth, human rights, environment
and labour. Within these spheres, organisations are initiated by the state itself
and moderate participation is encouraged within specific but frequently
changing parameters. (Gilbert 2016, 1556.)
Kulmala (2016, 200) notes that socially oriented civil society organisations are
typically overlooked in the Western scholarly investigations of Russian civil
society, which have emphasised the oppositional activities and
political/advocacy role of Russian citizens’ groups. This thesis follows “the
Western scholarly trend” of focusing on the distinctly “political” organisations
and their work. This is solely due to the fact that the organisations, which have
been affected by the Law on Foreign Agents happen to work with issues of
advocacy and societal change rather than service provision. As noted earlier,
this thesis does not aim at analysing the civil society as a whole, but the
organisation that have been influenced by this particular law. Based on previous
research, it is stated here that this division between advocacy- and service-
oriented organisations does exist and is actively promoted by the state. The
next two chapters will discuss separately the specific traits of service/socially-
oriented organisations and politically/advocacy-oriented organisations.
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3.6.1 Service/socially-orientated organisations
The majority of Russian civil society organisations (approximately 30 per cent)
are listed to work with questions concerning socially oriented issues (Cook &
Vinogradova 2006, 28). Kulmala (2016) also mentions that the majority of
Russia’s civil society organisations appear to work with questions concerning
social welfare (Kulmala 2016, 200).
Benevolenski & Toepler (2017) note that Russia has cracked down on politically
active civil society, increased regulation and cut foreign support for these
NGOs. However, apolitical, service-oriented parts of civil society have not been
subject to these restrictive policies. In contrast, since 2009 Russia has
introduced a set of government tools to support socially oriented non-profit
organisations. (Benevolenski & Toepler 2017, 64.)
Benevolenski & Toepler suggest that the Russian government is favourably
disposed towards working with domestic NGOs on politically undisputed issues,
such as social policy, as long as the state’s responsibility for its citizens remains
unquestioned. This idea also supports the reasoning behind the creation of the
Public Chamber in 2005, which is a consultative body of civil society
representatives that “reflected a vision of society not as an actor in its own right,
but rather as helping the state to govern more effectively”. (Benevolenski &
Toepler 2017, 66-67.)
In a neoliberal view civil society comprising of Putnam-style12 apolitical NGOs
contributes to good governance and efforts to improve and strengthen the state
through building trust and norms of reciprocity among the population, while
helping the government to address public needs (ibid., 66). Although, the
precondition for this type of mutual contribution to be beneficial would be that
the state is transparent in its actions and reforms. This does not seem to be the
case in Russia; hence, this type of cooperation seems utopian in the current
state of affairs.
12 Classic book on civil engagement by Robert Putnam (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival
of American Community
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Nonet & Selznick (2001) note that there is a need to encourage a renewed
appreciation of the interplay of legal theory and social policy. By policy, they
reference to basic perspectives that determine how public purposes are defined
and how practical alternatives are perceived. (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 3.) For
further study, the outsourcing of social services to the civil society in Russia
would be a fruitful approach on the state-society relations from a public policy
approach.
3.6.2 Politically/advocacy-orientated organisations
For social scientists the definition of what is meant by “political” is central, but as
the concept of civil society is debateable. Especially in the case of Russia, the
definition of “political” is ambivalent and answers to various interpretations.
Kulmala (2016) notes that aiming at societal change through changing laws or
influencing public opinion obviously counts as political, as does systematic
advocacy for interests and rights of certain groups. Kulmala adds that
transforming personal issues into public issues through the work of NGOs can
also be seen as political activity. (Kulmala 2016, 207.) The organisations based
in St. Petersburg, which are affected by the Law on Foreign Agents are in
several ways a homogeneous group. They have aims that could be described
as political in a sense that they seek to improve certain aspects of their country,
city, field of interest etc. It is common though, that the organisations themselves
do not describe their work as political. This issue will be further discussed in
Chapter 6.3.
In Russian language the word политика (politics) has strong connotations, a
narrow meaning and it is mainly associated with party politics. There is no clear
distinction in the Russian language for doing politics and policy-making. Policy-
making refers to the act of creating laws (or other official norms), doing politics
refers to activities aimed at influencing something in a given society. As the
Russian term refers exclusively to policy-making, a claim made by an NGO of
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"not being political" does not necessarily mean that the NGO has no societal
impact. (Kulmala 2016, 206.)
In order to be registered as a foreign agent, the work of the organisation has to
be classified as political by the authorities, in addition to the receiving of foreign
funding. Up until January 2016, what was meant by “political activity” was not
defined by the state. When the Russian Ministry of Justice published the list of
“political activity”, it was very wide consisting of e.g. participating in, organizing
and carrying out public events such as rallies, protests, demonstrations,
marches or pickets and assessing the government's decisions and policies.
This list (see Chapter 1), which consists of nearly all functions that independent
civil society should be able to conduct, contradicts greatly with the idea that
NGOs themselves have of the meaning of the word “political” (further discussed
in Chapter 6.3). The list is of no avail in the sense that it could be stated that all
NGOs, which receive foreign funding can be put under inspections. The Law on
Foreign Agents received wide international criticism especially for the issue of
undefined political activity (e.g. Freedom House, Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International). When the Ministry of Justice in January 2016 published
the definition of political activity, some organisations mentioned that this
definition of political activity made the situation even worse, since now almost all
civil society activities can be legally categorised as political.
3.7 How do Russian people themselves view the third sector?
Passive civil society cannot be explained by a lack of social problems. Shocking
(by Western standards) gender inequality (McIntosh Sundström 2002, 225),
very poor conditions for workers (Crowley 2002) severe human rights problems
(Weiler 2002), big environmental problems (Bridges & Bridges 1996; cited in
Uhlin 2006, 57) and various other social problems persist in contemporary
Russia. All these problems could indicate high participation in civic activities to
tackle these issues (Uhlin 2006, 57).
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Unfortunately, regionally representative survey data is quite rare in Russia.
Russia-wide surveys, even when conducted in many different regions have
samples drawn to represent the whole Russian population. This data cannot be
used to draw conclusions about one specific region in comparison with other
regions. (Reisinger 2013, 11.) There was no data available on the public
opinion on the third sector in the St. Petersburg area alone. Hence, the
following tables represent the general outlook Russian people have on non-
governmental organisations and the term “foreign agent”. The first survey is
produced by Aleksanteri Institute and the other surveys are conducted by the
Levada centre. Levada centre13 is a non-governmental research centre and is
considered to produce reliable survey data14 on the public opinion of Russian
people (e.g. compared to ROSSTAT, which is the governmental institute).
Why is it necessary for this thesis to discuss the public opinion of the Russian
people? When describing the environment where the NGOs are operating in, it
is valuable to bring out the survey side on the views of the Russian public have
on the NGOs. The aim of the NGOs is to mobilise and work for their target-
groups, hence the public opinion is essential for their work. Mendelson (2015)
notes that the closing space around civil society demands a systematic inquiry
into the motives and the factors enabling the states to close the space, and
what are the good practises to prevent these events. She argues that the need
to use public survey data is a useful tool to increase the connectivity of NGOs to
the populations they are meant to serve and to generate new sources of
funding, including domestic ones. (Mendelson 2015, 11.)
In the “Social distinctions of Modern Russia”, a survey conducted by the
Aleksanteri Institute in 2015 (see appendix 4), one question was dedicated to
the trust people have in NGOs. Based on these statistics, the biggest group
51.5% comprised of the people, who are not quite sure what they think about
NGOs (somewhat trust, somewhat distrust and hard to say combined). The next
biggest group, with 34.5% of the respondents does not trust NGOs in their
13 Whilst writing this thesis, also Levada centre was inlcluded in the list of foreign agents.
14 The data by Levada centre is used by e.g. Human Rights Watch, Transparency International and
Freedom House among others
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activities (completely distrust and mainly distrust combined). The group that
trusts NGO activities (mainly trust and fully trust) makes up 14% of the data.
This shows that the vast majority of the Russian population is unsure of their
opinion or is not in favour of NGOs and their work. This low awareness and
negative views will be discussed further in Chapter 6.1.
There was a similar trend concerning the lack of understanding of the work of
NGOs in the Levada-conducted surveys (see appendix 4). For the question,
"Do you know what is a non-profit organisation" in 2012 the most popular reply
was "I heard something about it" 49% and in 2013 it had gone up to 52%. The
second most common answer was "I am not aware" with 24% in 2012 and 29%
in 2013. Similar question about the understanding of third sector functions was
"What, in your opinion non-profit organisations primarily do in Russia". The most
common replies in 2012 were "Aid to various groups of society" 42%, "Deal with
various social issues" 35%, "Defend civil rights" 21% and "Difficult to answer"
19%. In the question on “how would you estimate the performance of non-profit
organisations in Russia”, in 2012 the most popular reply was "Rather positive"
39%, "Difficult to answer" 38%, "Absolutely positive" 11% and "Rather negative"
10%.
Levada also included a question on the topic of foreign agents in this same
survey. On the question of "What is your general perception of the phrase
foreign agent" 62% replied "Negative, in general", 12% "Positive, in general"
and 26% "Difficult to answer". On the question of the meaning of the term
foreign agent: "What does "foreign agent" phrase mean to you?" 39% replied "A
spy, intelligence officer of a different country planted in Russia, an undercover
spy", 22% "Covert enemy from within active in Russia in the interest of other
states, a fifth column", 18% official representative of another state or foreign
commercial company, organisation openly representing interests of the
government, company or corporation in Russia", 11% "Any non-governmental
organisation, Russian or foreign, which receives foreign funds to finance the
activity in Russia" and 10% "Difficult to answer".
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On the question "What is your attitude towards the tougher law on non-
governmental organisations and the requirement to register as a "foreign agent"
for any organisation receiving funding from abroad?" in 2012 37% replied
"Difficult to answer", 28% "Rather positive", 17% "Absolutely positive". By 2013
"Difficult to answer" decreased from 37% to 30%, "Rather positive" increased
from 28% to 35% and "Absolutely positive" decreased to 14%.
The question on "What is your attitude to NPOs15 operating in Russia analysing
the national developmental outlook, civil rights defence and civil society
development in Russia and seeking foreign donations?", 42% replied "Rather
positive", 31% "Difficult to answer", 13% "Absolutely positive", 12% "Rather
negative".
In both the surveys, the level of unawareness or finding it difficult to answer was
high. The non-profit sector is not very familiar to the public in Russia, which is
one reason it is could be seen as quite vulnerable.
Howard (2002) provides one possible explanation for this lack of support for the
NGOs. He notes that after the collapse of communism, the number of NGOs
has been steadily increasing, but many of them have been created by Western
organisations and depend on Western funds. Howard sees that because of this
much or their organisational initiative comes from foreign sources, with low
understanding of communism and postcommunism. Therefore, the functions of
the NGOs might seem unfamiliar or even misguided. Moreover, the “new”
organisations supported by Western sources might contain an anti-communist
theme, which might be interpreted to imply that the way people lived under
communism was wrong and unethical. This condemnation of people’s personal
histories might have an effect of misunderstanding and disengagement.
(Howard 2002, 167.) Furthermore, Henderson (2003) raises a similar issue of
the external Western funding. Even well intentioned, it contributes to the
agenda of the funder. Henderson noted that it can be problematic that the
funders provide aid to organisations, which fit to the Western norms.
15 Non-profit organisations
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(Henderson 2003.) The issue on working for the right target groups will be
further discussed in Chapter 6.1.
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4. Theoretical framework - Repressive law in the context of transition
Since the objective of this thesis is to 1.) List and analyse the expedients the
organisations working under the Law on Foreign Agents have taken, 2.)
Describe the work environment of the organisations and 3.) Discuss possible
directions for development, the theoretical framework seems appropriate,
especially for the third question, to be built around jurisprudence; In particular
transitional and comparative legal theory. Comparative law is important tool for
studying countries that are in transition. Transition challenges a common stable
approach to law and makes us ask what law actually is (Nystén-Haarala 2001,
5-6.) As stated earlier, in Russia the courts and legal institutions are not
independent from politics (see e.g. Kozyreva & Smirnov 2015). Hence, in order
to observe the different aspects and possible developments, it creates a more
fruitful approach to place Russia in a particular category for analysis. Therefore,
the theoretical framework is built around two parts, the previous research
(mainly focusing on Ljubownikow et al. 2013; McIntosh Sundstrom 2002; Flikke
2016; Benevolenski & Toepler 2017) and the developmental model of legal
systems as indicators of society (Nonet & Selznick 2001).
The etymology of the term jurisprudence comes from the words "juris" law and
"prudence" wisdom. Hence, jurisprudence is a tool for understanding the
wisdom of law (Morrison 1997, 1). Rudolf Jhering (1861) was the first to use the
term interest jurisprudence. He states, that legal rule cannot be understood, if
its function in society is not understood. Legal rule is a way of achieving certain
goals in society - individual and communal. Jhering sees the legal rule to be a
purely teleological matter. Hence the person applying the law should look into
the goals and interests, which the judicial system should implement. When
getting this information, the judge can make a decision based on the judicial
system. Through this, Jhering showed the connection between applying the law
and societal reality. This on the other hands brings up the justified criticism, how
can one know the interests, which influence behind the provisions of law. Yet he
took the first steps towards including societal reality in legal thinking. (Aarnio
1975, 37-38.) In the Soviet Union, legal theory was called the theory of state
and law to emphasise that the two cannot be separated from each other and
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that it is the state that is the ultimate source of law. Law was a tool in the hands
of the ruling elites, which could direct the state in any direction that was
beneficial to the rulers themselves. (Nystén-Haarala 2001, 4.)
The existence of law per se does not guarantee fairness or justice. Every legal
order has a repressive potential, because it is always at some point bound to
the status quo. (Nonet and Selznick 2001, 14-15, 29.) Following this reasoning,
the idea of repressive law in the post-Soviet context will be introduced and
discussed. As noted earlier by Henry and McIntosh Sundstrom (2006) applying
a concept developed in the West to a non-Western context, the customary
practises and types of cooperation that are common in that environment should
be noted (Henry & McIntosh Sundstrom 2006, 325). This remark is duly noted in
this thesis. Multiple researchers have raised in their work this problem of the
use of a Western concept in a non-Western context (see e.g. Ljubownikov et al
2013; Hale 2002; Sakwa 2015).
Nystén-Haarala argues that after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia has
been in a process of fundamental socioeconomic transition, which can be
described as transition to market economy, democracy and the rule of law. Law
constitutes the official rules, which can be enforced by coercive legal means.
Law is an institution working within a larger institutional framework of enforced
norms, routines, conventions and traditions. Law does not function in a vacuum
but within the institutional framework of the society. For this reason a holistic
view is necessary to understand transition and the role of law in this process.
(Nystén-Haarala 2001, 1-2.) Hence, it is suggested here, that transitional legal
theories apply to interpreting and discussing the Law on Foreign Agents.
In the next chapter following Nystén-Haarala’s thinking, of 1.) Russia being in a
state of transition and 2.) The need for comparative law to study countries that
are in transition, the theory by Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick from their
book Law & Society in Transition – Toward Responsive Law (2001) will be
introduced and discussed. Transitional justice can be seen as an instrument of
social transformation, which is based on the assumption that societies need to
confront past abuses in order to come to terms with their history and develop for
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the better. Transitional justice as a separate field of research first appeared
during the ‘third wave’ of democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe. It
emerged as an idea during the transition of states in those regions from
dictatorial or authoritarian regimes to liberal market democracies. (Huntington,
1993.)
The enormous question of "what is law" has been discussed from time to time in
different societies by different scholars, and jurisprudence at its simplest can be
seen as an anthology of answers to this question (Morrison 1997, 1). Nonet and
Selznick note, that the definition of law should not be confused with the theory
of law and that law is an outcome and not a starting point (Nonet & Selznick
2001, 10-11). This thesis will not go into further detail on the essence of law and
legislation as such, but define it as an outcome of certain events. Nobles and
Schiff (2006) raise the question on how should one account for different
theories within jurisprudence, when each theory might present a better or worse
description of the self-understanding of law or legal institutions. Each theory in
this light becomes no more than a subjective account for what really reflects the
law and legal institution. (Nobles & Schiff 2006, 7.) There is not a theory that
would give a comprehensive view on the relation of law and society, and this
limitation is recognised. The attempt here is not to produce a comprehensive
view, but to describe the traits, context and outcomes of a certain law among a
certain group.
In the case of Russia, the events that shape the current legislation can be seen
to be related to history, weak institutions and privileged position of political
elites. Hence, the situation in Russia is contextualised by putting the current
legal order in a developmental model of different legal orders created by Nonet
& Selznick (2001). This model (see appendix 2) draws from the developmental
model of bureaucracy (see appendix 3). This positioning makes it easier to
analyse the situation with the law on foreign agents, since it places Russia in
sphere with specific preconditions. Nonet and Selznick use the discussion on
the stages of bureaucracy in social science to make a point, that under
appropriate conditions, specific processes emerge that tend to transform ad hoc
pre-bureaucratic decision-making into more systematic bureaucratic decision-
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making. (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 21-23.) They make this reference to justify the
use of their own tripartition into repressive law, autonomous law and responsive
law, and the use of this model in a developmental approach.
Nonet and Selznick acknowledge that the mentioned developmental model of
bureaucracy (see appendix 3) is not a historical synopsis. Rather, it is a theory
of institutional constraint and response whose intellectual function is to identify
potentials for change in a specified range of situations. Hence, a developmental
model of bureaucracy is a complex dispositional statement and it proposes that
in certain stages a system will generate forces leading to specified changes. It
is helpful if it successfully identifies characteristic stresses, problems,
opportunities, expectations and emergent adaptations. These may and do
suggest the direction of change, but they cannot tell what will actually happen,
since that always depends on widely varying conditions. (Nonet & Selznick
2001, 23.)
Nonet and Selznick (2001) define three types of “states” for law-in-society
(appendix 2): 1. Law as the servant of repressive power 2. Law as the
differentiated institution capable of taming repression and protecting its own
integrity and 3. Law as a facilitator of response to social needs and aspirations.
They note, that no complex legal order or sector of it ever forms a fully coherent
system: any given legal order or legal institution is likely to have a “mixed”
character, combining the three types. Nevertheless, all systems exhibit
characteristics of one type over the other two. (Nonet and Selznick 2001, 14-15,
17.)
The categories for placing a certain state in a certain “type of law” are as
follows: Ends of law, legitimacy, rules, reasoning, discretion, coercion, morality,
politics, expectations of obedience and participation. Here, Russia is placed in
the category of “repressive law” and the next chapter will discuss the reasoning
behind this categorisation and present arguments for each category.
The ends of law are defined by mainly order: this can be seen not only in the
Law on Foreign Agents, but also in other laws as well e.g. the Law on Freedom
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of Assembly, the Law criminalising defamation and the Law expanding the
definition of treason (ICNL 2015). The legitimacy is based on social defence
and the raison d’état: as Evans (2006) noted, Putin prefers organisations that
share his view for a strong state, nationalistic themes and traditional Russian
values (Evans 2006, 149). The reasoning for law is ad hoc and particularistic:
the Duma Deputy Alexander Sidyakin who initiated the law on foreign agents,
stated the law does not aim at “prohibiting or restricting activities or undermining
the rights of nongovernmental organizations, but at helping to ensure
transparency for those who act as foreign agents, to make that information clear
for Russian citizens”. It was also stated by Duma deputies from United Russia
that the law was aimed at “controlling foreign interference” in affairs of Russia.
This gives the impression that there are indeed organisations present in Russia,
which work only for the benefits of other nations. The discretion is defined as
pervasive an opportunistic: as noted earlier, international legal experts and legal
experts in Russia have criticized the law’s broad interpretation, how rapidly it
was adopted, and the additional burdens it imposes on NGOs. It was also
condemned by most of Russia’s leading human rights groups as part of an
effort to stain advocacy groups as “spies” or “hidden enemies.” (HRW 2013, 12-
13.) Coercion is extensive and weakly restrained: the coercion can be seen as
extensive and weakly restrained based on e.g. the laws adopted for limiting
public protests and defamation, which relates to the earlier mentioned ends of
law of being mainly order. The morality is based on communal morality, legal
moralism and morality of constraint: as Evans (2006) noted earlier, Putin has a
preference for organisations, which promote traditional Russian values (Evans
2006, 149). These values have a strong emphasis on the moral values and
moral superiority, which Putin wants Russia to uphold. Politics, law is
subordinate to power politics: as Rutland noted, the rule of law is exceptionally
weak in Russia and the state is able to exercise strong influence over most
social actors (Rutland 2006, 74-75). The expectations for obedience are
unconditional and disobedience per se punished as defiance: when looking at
the law on foreign agents, the non-compliance to this law can result in large
fines (up to 500,000 RUB, approximately 8300 EUR, per organisation). This
includes also failing to mark materials published by the organisation as a
publication by a foreign agent. (HRW 2013, 17-18.) Participation is submissive
40
compliance and criticism is seen as disloyalty: this is also consistent with
presenting critical organisations as “foreign agents”. Moreover, the wide
definition of defamation allows the authorities to present critical voices as
disloyal to the state (HRW 2013, 73-74).
Hence, the category of law as the servant of repressive power, or plainly
repressive law is best seen to describe the current legal state of contemporary
Russia. Nonet and Selznick also argue, that repression is a “natural” response
to certain stages of legal and social formation and there are conditions under
which it was perhaps wiser, maybe necessary course of institutional evolution, if
only because no practical alternative was available (Nonet and Selznick 2001,
25). Nonet and Selznick note that repressive, autonomous and responsive law
are not only distinct types of law, but in some sense stages of evolution in
relation to law to the political and social order (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 18). As
Malcom Feeley (1979) writes in his book review on Law & Society in Transition,
Nonet and Selznick convincingly justify that the essence of repressive law is
moralism and ultimately its appeal is derived not from fear, but from the premise
that only through the use of efficient exercise of force can the security and
morality of social order be preserved. (Feeley 1979, 900.)
When applying a developmental perspective to the three types of law, Nonet
and Selznick admit that the application can be troublesome and controversial.
They also note, that the criticism of theories of development are properly
addressed, but the basic perspective is fruitful and even inescapable. (Nonet &
Selznick 2001, 18-19.) Feeley (1979) criticises the logic and dynamic of the
evolutionary model not to be very convincing. He mentions that the analysis is
concentrated on what might be called the "inner logic of law" and leaves the
external social forces to less attention. Furthermore, Feeley mentions that the
book by Nonet and Selznick is lacking the discussion of law and politics. Feeley
also suggests that these problems may stem from their developmental
approach, a perspective that emphasises the inner-logic of the law. (Feeley
1979, 901.) Nevertheless, as Nonet and Selznick themselves state above, the
main idea is to identify potentials for change in a specified range of situations
and not to predict future developments as such.
41
Feeley also questions the level of analysis the model by Nonet & Selznick
meant to be used. Is it meant for analysing substance, style or neither. Feeley
sees that by failing to distinguish the levels of analysis, the authors fail to make
problematic the central focus of their investigation, the relation of legal
legitimacy to actual legal practices. He sees the result of Nonet and Selznick's
work as an insightful discussion, but lacking analytical power (Feeley 1979,
904.) As Kagan argues in his foreword to the Law & Society in Transition, the
book is especially useful since it incorporates both political and jurisprudential
aspects of law and it speaks directly to contemporary struggles over the proper
place of law in democratic governance. (Kagan 2001, viii.) Feeley also notes,
that Nonet and Selznick’s discussion may be directed more appropriately at
different foundations on which political authority, not law, rests. (Feeley 1979,
907).
The critique from Feeley is duly noted and is taken into account when analysing
the empirical findings. This thesis aims at identifying the persistent and new
limitations and emergent adaptations described by the organisations and
identifying these though characteristic stresses, problems, opportunities,
expectations and emergent adaptations.
Moreover, noting the critique and seeing it as appropriate, the aim here is not to
provide a developmental model to predict the next step of events, but to
describe and discuss the current situation in its own framework. For the last part
of analysis I noticed Feeley’s criticism to be relevant. It was relevant on the part
that it questioned the level of analysis by Nonet & Selznick’s model is meant to
be used. Is it meant for analysing substance, style or neither? As Feeley noted
above, by failing to distinguish the levels of analysis, the authors fail to make
problematic the central focus of their investigation. In his view, this contributes
to the lack of analytical power. The framework of repressive law can and is used
here to describe Russia’s preconditions, but it does not provide such a useful
analytical tool.
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To produce a more tangible synopsis of the main findings, I chose to use the
helpful characteristics of the developmental model of bureaucracy, on which
Nonet and Selznick have based their tripartation to three types of law. Nonet
and Selznick state, that the main function of a useful developmental model is to
identify potentials for change. Hence, a developmental model of bureaucracy
proposes that in certain stages a system will generate forces leading to
specified changes. As stated, it is helpful if it successfully identifies
characteristic stresses, problems, opportunities, expectations and emergent
adaptations. These may and do suggest the direction of change, but they
cannot tell what will actually happen, since that always depends on widely
varying conditions. (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 23.)
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5. Methods and data
As Kvale (1996) notes, the original Greek meaning of the word method is “a
route that leads to the goal”. This chapter thus describes the research methods,
which were chosen to best lead to the goals of answering the research
questions.
5.1 Qualitative case study
This thesis is a qualitative case study on the part of the non-governmental
sector, which is operating under the law on foreign agents in St. Petersburg
Russia in the years 2015-2016. The data is limited to one city due to the vast
regional differences in Russia, as stated in Chapter 3.2. Collective case study
and content analysis were chosen as the most appropriate methods to
accomplish the goals of this thesis. Collective case study is used when a
number of cases are studied in order to investigate a general phenomenon
(Silverman 2005, 127). Case study research is a heterogeneous activity
covering a range of research methods and techniques, a range of coverage
(from single case study through to multiple cases), varied levels of analysis
(individuals, groups, organisations, organisational fields or social policies), and
differing in lengths and levels of involvement in organisational functioning
(Hartley 2004, 332).
The need to use case study as a method arises from the desire to understand
complex social phenomena. Briefly described the case study method allows
researchers to retain a holistic and meaningful picture of real-life events. (Yin
2009, 4.) Although case study is not a research method itself, it is an approach
to studying reality (Saarela-Kinnunen & Eskola 2010, 159). This is where
content analysis is used as a tool for processing the data. Despite the strength
of a case study to focus on and describe one phenomenon, it can be criticized
for its lack of representativeness and generalizability. This is why it is important
in this research, with this approach to ensure a transparent reporting of the
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process, for the reader to estimate to what extent the results can be
generalized. (Saarela-Kinnunen & Eskola 2010, 162.)
The method of selecting the sample for this thesis is called elite sampling. Elite
sampling is closely related to snowball sampling, which means that one suitable
interviewee leads to another. Elite sampling differs in the sense that the
interviewees are selected based on the researcher’s presumption on who would
give the most relevant information on the case. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 88.)
The main source for selecting the organisations to be interviewed was the
website of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, where the list of
foreign agents is available and updated. In addition, I received information from
interviewees about other potential organisations to interview and include in my
data.
The transcriptions were done without adding the pauses or other specifications
on how something was said. The focus in this thesis is on the content rather
than on e.g. rhetoric means. The level of the accuracy of transcribing interviews
depends on the kind of analysis and for this type of analysis, this level is
sufficient. Content analysis is data processing by classifying, searching for
similarities and differences and condensing the data. Content analysis focuses
on creating a compact description, which connects the results into the wider
context of the phenomenon and previous researches. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002,
105.)
The study followed a seven-stage route described by Kvale (1996, 83):
thematising, designing, interviewing, transcribing, interpreting, verifying and
reporting.
Before the planning and conducting the interviews, the researcher should
develop a conceptual and theoretical understanding about the phenomena
investigated and establish a base to which new knowledge will be added (Kvale
1996, 95-96). My Bachelor’s thesis was on the Russian civil society and the
roles of personal networks in civil society development. This background has
given me insight on the developments of post-Soviet civil society and previous
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research on the topic. In addition, have closely followed the Law on Foreign
Agents from the media and attended seminars, where this topic has been
discussed.
5.2 Conducting the interviews
The Law on Foreign Agents outlined the group of NGOs to be interviewed.
Currently 16 , there are nine NGOs on the list of foreign agents from St.
Petersburg. The data consists of nine interviews from experts from nine
different Russian organisations based in St. Petersburg, which have been
affected by the foreign agent legislation. One of the organisations was not on
the list of foreign agents, but has been under multiple investigations from the
Ministry of Justice on their possible functions of a foreign agent. One of the
organisations on the other hand had managed to remove itself from the list of
foreign agents. Since the focus of this thesis was to observe NGOs that have
been affected by legislation it is justified that these organisations are relevant
and even a useful addition to the data.
The list on the Ministry of Justice website was a good starting point to find the
NGOs for the interviews. After sending out requests for the potential
interviewees, I received positive replies to all my e-mails. All the e-mails were
answered and all the people I requested for  interviews agreed to meet me.
Roberts (2012) notes that Russia can be a relatively challenging research
environment due to e.g. the problem of arranging interviews with experts. I
believe that it might have had an effect that at the time of arranging these
interviews I was working in a research centre in St. Petersburg. Knowing the
right people might have made me more trustworthy in the eyes of the
interviewees. I see this as a significant asset in my work. All the interviews were
conducted in St. Petersburg between June 2015 and January 2016. The criteria
to be an interviewee in this thesis were that 1.) The interviewee is working in an
organisation in St. Petersburg, which has been affected by the Law on Foreign
Agents and 2.) The interviewee has (preferably) worked in the organisation for
16 20.4.2017
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at least 3 years, hence they have experienced the time before and after the Law
on Foreign Agents was passed and enforced and 3.) Could be able to
participate in English.17
The questions for the interviews (see appendix 6) were designed to meet the
objectives of the research questions. The main aim was to hear from the
experts: what are the changes in their work, how do they describe these
changes, how do they describe the Russian third sector in general, how do they
see their work within this sector, how do they see the state-society relations and
how do perceive their connections to the Russian public.
The interviews were carried out by semi-structured means to give more
openness and to discuss the issues by themes. This allows the interview to be
more open, which suits the goals of a case study well. The openness and
flexibility of the semi-structured interview brings many on the spot decisions, for
example weather to follow a new lead or stick to the interview structure
precisely (Kvale 1996, 83). The interviewer introduces an issue or a problem to
be uncovered, follows up on the subjects of the answers, and seeks new
information and angles on the topic. (ibid., 97.)
The interviews were conducted anonymously. It is a common issue for the
researcher to contemplate on how many participants for the interview are
necessary for the purpose of the research. Kvale (1996) gives a simplified
answer: “interview as many subjects as necessary to find out what you need to
know”. Naturally, the number of participants depends on the purpose of the
study, but in current interview studies the number of interviews tend to be
around 15 ± 10. (Kvale 1996, 101-102.)
5.3 Research ethics
Here the research ethics are based upon the ethical guidelines by the Social
Research Association (2003). Research can never be entirely objective since
17 One of the interviews was conducted with the help of an interpreter
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the selection of topics commonly reflect a bias of cultural or personal values.
Even so, the social science researcher needs to pursue objectivity and to be
open about the possible constraints for its achievement. (SRA 2003, 18.) In my
case, the personal interest and personal values were present when I chose the
topic for this thesis, but as stated above it is quite natural to pursue research on
a topic related to personal and professional interests. As mentioned before, at
the time of conducting the first interviews I was working for an NGO in St.
Petersburg, which was listed as a foreign agent. I do not see this questionable
for the research ethics in this thesis, but rather as a valuable addition to my
insight on this matter. The off-the-record conversations I have had on the topic
and seminars I have attended have definitely shaped my thinking on this matter.
All the interviewees were aware that the interviews are recorded, transcribed
and used for my thesis. The interviewees were also promised anonymity. All the
interviewees were women and aged approximately between 25 and 65. All the
interviewed organisations were all very professional in their work.
5.4 Thematising the data
The interviews were conducted by semi-structured means, hence thematising
the text was a natural step in the analysis of the transcribed interviews. The
topics selected for the interviews are found in all of the answers, but in different
quantities and different ways. Sometimes the themes resemble the base of the
interview, but not always. When creating the themes, coding and/or
quantification can be useful. When the data is organised by different themes,
under each theme there should be coded parts of the transcribed text that
mention these themes. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006.) The method
for the data-analysis was inductive and the tool used for this step was the
programme for qualitative research Atlas.ti.
I started with reading through transcribed text of 79 pages multiple times the
looking for recurrent topics, which I found to be important for answering the
48
research questions. Atlas.ti was a useful tool for this step and allowed the data
to be processed in a concise way. The codes I first started with were:
Achievements of NGOs, bureaucracy, changes in every-day work,
changes in form of organisation, collaboration, court trials, foreign
agents-law, funding, incidents with officials, main goals of NGO,
main law to affect NGOs work, ministry of justice, notices of
violation, other laws, political activity, ruling elites, Russian NGO
sphere in general, understanding non-governmental work, view on
improvements, views of the future and why the repressive
legislation.
The most frequently mentioned codes were the foreign agents legislation,
changes in the form of the organisation, Russian NGO sphere in general,
funding, changes in every-day work, incidents with officials and views of the
future. From these codes, I moved on to identifying the main categories, which
would best describe the findings from my data in pursuing to identify the
persistent and new limitations and emergent adaptations. These categories
were selected with the research questions and previous research in mind.
Chapter 6 is divided into ten chapters for analysis. The final categories are:
public support for the NGOs, funding (divided into funding from Russia and
international funding), political activity (divided into political activity defined by
and state and political activity defined by the organisaitons), legal environment,
term “foreign agent”, cooperation, concrete effects to the work of the NGOs
(divided into changes in the work of the NGO and changes in the form of the
NGO), harassment met by NGOs and views on the future and potentials for
change.
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6. Working under the Law on Foreign Agents in St.
Petersburg
Based on the empirical findings, the general work environment for the NGOs
working under the Law on Foreign Agents is arbitrary and unpredictable. Due to
the mixed messages by the government and the ambivalent legislation, the
work environment is not eminently encouraging or enabling. Even if the NGO is
law-abiding and follows the regulations, they still might encounter problems with
the authorities due to the nature of their work. This uncertainty was repeated in
all the interviews. There is a strong and persistent fear of making a wrong move
that might result in problems for the NGO. Making plans for the future and
planning projects can be very frustrating, since the outcome may be
unpredictable due to reasons not directly caused by the organisation. The next
ten chapters contribute to the knowledge on different factors on why this is so.
6.1 “You just don’t understand that you are serving a foreign state’s
interest, they just use you”
This chapter discusses the public support for and the public views about the
NGOs in St. Petersburg. The lack of public support is related to a number of
issues, but the most frequently mentioned were media coverage of the NGOs,
lack of understanding of human rights and the third sector in general, fear of
working with foreign agents, misunderstanding of foreign funding, people being
busy with their personal life and not having interest in the work of the third
sector and that NGOs do not work well for their target audiences.
The Law on Foreign Agents has not received mentionable criticism or mobilised
the Russian public. Based on the data (see appendix 4) and the interviews, the
fact that the work of NGOs in not very well understood can be seen as one of
the factors. As mentioned in one of the interviews, not only might the work on
NGOs be difficult to comprehend, but the whole third sector itself can be a
distant concept:
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“…people do not understand what is it, the third sector, what is it for
society? Why it is important. They have state and they have
business, we understand that we are not state and we are not
business and it is our bonus” (Interview 4 Quotation # 16_122).
When this background is connected with biased media reporting and the use of
the term foreign agent, lack of public support for the NGOs listed as foreign
agents can be understood in this context.
Misunderstanding of the work of the NGOs and lack of support was a repeated
answer to the question on public support for the NGOs. Based on the interviews
universal values, which sometimes can be abstract, are difficult to work with.
Organisations, which work with more concrete and everyday issues, tend to be
seen in a more positive light than the ones that work with issues such as human
rights, rights of the media or freedom of information. It was also mentioned that
people are not fully aware of the rights that belong to them, hence they do not
know to question a wide range of issues or demand these rights.
"I would say that in general there is a very low awareness of human
rights, the whole human rights discourse in the general public, the
awareness what it means, why is it useful, how it serves Russian
citizens, is close to zero, so it’s a kind of language Russian public
understand very little of." (Interview 5 Quotation # 5_150).
“…I always don’t know how to explain that I don’t serve any
national state interest. Not Russian, not American, not Finnish. I
have my own professional interests. But people doesn’t
understand, “You just don’t understand that you are serving their
state-interest, they just use you”” (Interview 4 Quotation # 8_114.)
The interviewees also mentioned that the unstable financial situation in Russia
contributes to people being occupied with their personal problems and does not
encourage to promote the universal rights of others, or there is simply no time to
do so. Personal and family matters come first and other issues are seen as
secondary.
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"...people are getting more poor because of this currency crisis and
so they tend not to give money if they have their own problems. So
in general I can tell that government do nothing to protect this NGO
sector." (Interview 3 Quotation # 27_99).
"So the most of the understanding lies in the areas of charities to
support sick children, charities to support animals, very little
understanding in the area of human rights, maybe some social aid
assistance to elderly, but human rights no." (Interview 5 Quotation
# 6_151).
When an NGO deals with more concrete matters, such as children’s health or
animals in need, the work is more concrete and easier to comprehend.
“When you are talking about something not particular, it’s if you’re
talking about nothing. You need simple explanations with some
examples to explain it. “(Interview 3 Quotation # 20_92.)
The media has a big influence over peoples' views and when the term foreign
agent is used as equivalent of a spy, it is likely to cause misunderstandings on
the nature of the work of the NGOs. The majority of Russian media outlets are
state-owned and these outlets actively promote this image. Hence, the role of
the state in creating this division is seen as active not only though funding, but
also though the state-owned media.
“We need to change it minds of the people and it is a real
challenge. It is a situation when state controls mass media, you
don’t really have these resources to change” (Interview 4 Quotation
# 16_122).
“We are aware of not only prejudices but also influence of
propaganda and if NGOs and foreign agents are targeted as the
main reasons of the problems of the country so of course it’s
prejudices.” (Interview 7 Quotation # 37_247)
Public support for NGOs needs be discussed from the side of the state and its
active role and persistence of historical trajectories, but also from the side of the
organisations as active players. Based on the interviews, the most frequently
mentioned reason for the lack of public support was that the organisations do
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not always meet the needs of their target groups. This relates to the quality of
the work of NGOs. The third sector in Russia is relatively new, so it was
mentioned that it is searching for its own form and way of working (see
Ljubownikow et al. 2013). The issue of working efficiently for the target
audiences needs to be taken into account. Only because an organisation is
working for the third sector with a subject matter that is recognised as
universally good, it does not automatically mean that the work they do is of
good quality or beneficial for the public. In order for the people to start
supporting the organisations and take part, they have to also see the quality of
the work and see how it is beneficial for them. As McIntosh Sundstom (2002)
notes the civil society should act as a forum, which serves the interests of the
public and communicates the citizens’ preferences and demands to the
government (McIntosh Sundstom 2002, 209). Unfortunately far more
organisations engage in their own internal organisational work and movement
development rather than in activities that involve work with average citizens
(ibid., 214).
"Not many NGOs clearly understand the needs of their target
audience and they don’t just take it into account. I think that they do
good and brave and very important work but they don’t think for
who they are working. It’s a very common problem. I can just name
less than ten organisations that work really good for their audience.
And many organisations just take grants and they do a lot of work
but it goes for nothing. And this is a main problem. Working for the
real people, for their needs, not for the abstract ideas." (Interview 3
Quotation # 34_106).
“I would also say that a lot of human rights organisations are not,
they do not know how to mobilise their beneficiaries” (Interview 5
Quotation # 12_157).
The empirical findings presented in this chapter follow the similar trend as e.g.
McIntosh Sundstrom’s (2002) findings 18 . McIntosh Sundstrom (2002, 215)
noted that it is not only a problem of outreach to average citizen’s but also a
18 McIntosh Sundstrom’s (2002) study was on Russian women’s movements, but similarities can be
found.
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problem of public opinion. Thus, the issues McIntosh Sundstrom (2002) raised
15 years ago still seem to be relevant today.
6.2 “They really cannot understand what they are buying and what I
sell”
This chapter discusses the different issues related to funding. Foreign funding is
the other criteria in addition to political activity to be included on the list of
foreign agents. It plays a central role in not only the upholding of the NGOs
functions, but it also defines the work of the organisation. The functional side is
simply that the organisation has enough funds to be able to pay rent, salaries
and have the capability to fulfil the goals of the organisation. The defining factor
will be discussed further on, but organisations that receive foreign funding are
automatically under more strict government control and are exposed to criticism
and misunderstandings.
Many of the organisations have received large fines (up to 500,000 RUB, 8300
EUR) for not registering voluntarily as foreign agents. When the law was
adopted in 2012, the organisations had the choice whether to register or not
and the Ministry of Justice could not add them on the registry of foreign agents
without the organisations consent. This was changed in 2013 and from then on,
the Ministry of Justice can add NGOs on the list if they meet the criteria of
performing the functions of a foreign agent. Most of the organisations did not
register voluntarily since they did not consider themselves as foreign agents.
This lead to fines and legal proceedings, of which some were still ongoing
during the interviews. All the NGOs interviewed for this thesis had managed to
pay off their fines and continue their work. Not all NGOs have been equally
successful. In the next chapters, the national and international funding are
divided into two categories and discussed separately.
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6.2.1 Receiving of funds from Russia
The so-called Presidential Grant (Rustamova 2014) is a state provided grant for
the Russian organisations operating in Russia. It is the main form of monetary
support, which the state offers the third sector in Russia. Out of the nine NGOs
interviewed three of them had received some support from the Russian
government, but it was earmarked for specific projects rather than for the work
of the NGO in general.
Benevolenski and Toepler (2017) note that despite the limitations to access
foreign funding and the worsening conditions for NGOs working with advocacy,
even some of the most prominent radical civil society organisations have
continued to receive government support. In fact, even NGOs, which have been
included in the “foreign agents” registry, have simultaneously been receiving
government funding through the presidential grants programme. (Benevolenski
& Toepler 2017, 72.)
"We practically never received any funding from Russian
government. We, in fact, to be true, we received it twice. One we
received it from the St. Petersburg parliament in 2000, because
they asked us to prepare a collection of materials for children rights.
They gave us some money to publish it. And the second time we
received it from so-called presidential grants, a kind of competition
and civil dignity one of the presidential grants operator we applied
and received money for NGO programs on legal assistance to
vulnerable groups." (Interview 1 Quotation # 12_10).
I would argue that even though the organisations have received money from the
presidential grants, it is the conditions under which they are provided that make
this support controversial. This type of support is narrow in the sense that it
does not contribute to an enabling environment for the organisations. This does
not credit the organisations and let them answer to the issues they see as
central, but it rather makes the NGOs work for the state’s needs and
complements its service sector. The government cannot support all NGOs, but
the organisations that were interviewed expressed their concern that the
government gave the finances in its own terms and preferences and with
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emphasis on socially oriented programmes, political youth programmes (such
as Nashi), which do not act as bottom-up initiatives, but rather support the
values and goals of the state.
“…most of the government grants are going on to Russian orthodox
church, over about 80%, or something. There are some figures
recently released about how much money the orthodox church has
got from the presidential grants ... all these kind of neo-nationalist
groups are also kind of getting the funds and all these ones that are
promoting traditional values all the money is going to these
organisations”  (Interview 6 Quotation # 13_183.)
These comments reflect the divide between socially and politically oriented
organisations. Based on the interviews, the majority of support is seen to be
given to socially oriented organisations, than to "politically" oriented
organisations. This type of practise seems to go against civil society’s role in
answering to the needs of the population and the basics of a bottom-up
approach. Some organisations reported that they do not want to apply for
Russian funding, since the application process is time-consuming and they saw
that they would not receive the funding anyway for the nature of their work.
“…first of all they don’t give us money. Second we think twice
whether to apply for some money, we are by getting that money
experiencing something conflict of interest. We don’t do that. So
that money comes from USA, from other countries and then the
state rejects us as has style to this state and it’s difficult to even
defend ourselves.” (Interview 2 Quotation # 8_43).
The previous comment sums up one of the main problems with funding from
Russia. The organisations mentioned that there are certain themes that the
state simply does not fund. The examples used were investigating corruption
and LGBT-rights, but generally one could say that state does not provide
funding for issues that are against its own policies.
“…it would be highly unlikely anyway that they would finance us
anyway” (Interview 6 Quotation # 13_183.)
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“But this society never give any money for that. It was society of
foreign countries. And then, now we need to change to survive."
(Interview 4 Quotation # 15_121).
“Because in Russia people are not used to giving, making
donations. you don’t have that kind of culture here.” (Interview 6
Quotation # 34_204).
Funding received as donations could be one way of financing the work of the
NGOs. As mentioned in the quote above, charitable giving is not very common
in Russia, especially for “abstract universal values”. The donations in Russia by
businesses and individuals are mainly aimed towards the “neediest” sections of
society. Since the topics that the NGOs listed as foreign agents work with can
be seen as “abstract” or even purely “Western”, donating money would not bring
praise to Russian firms if they choose to support them (McIntosh Sundstrom
2002, 222). Openly supporting NGOs on the list of foreign agents (or NGOs with
similar goals) as an individual or a business might in the contrary cause
negative effects for the person or the business. The most famous case of this
type of action would be the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. He was arrested in
2003 for charges on tax evasion after funding the political opposition and civil
society in general in Russia (Rutland 2006, 81). The quote 15_121 “…now we
need to change to survive” sums up a major issue with the funding of the civil
society in Russia. The lack of Russian funding and the receiving of foreign
funding has led to changes within organisations. These changes will be further
discussed in the chapter 6.7.1.
6.2.2 Receiving of foreign funds
The receiving of foreign funding can lead to misunderstandings on the nature of
the work of the NGO. It was frequently mentioned that foreign funding is
commonly seen as foreign influence. This applies especially when it comes to
funding from the US, but funding from other Western countries as well. As
Henderson (2003) notes, human rights groups rarely receive financial support
from the government or local businesses and are dependent on foreign aid
(Henderson 2003, 46).
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"…even people who are quite critical-thinking have been influenced
by that it’s not ok, financing from abroad. Then of course what kind
of prejudices, oh yes you implement will of state department of USA
or this kind of prejudices." (Interview 7 Quotation # 12_222).
"...they [Russian people] really cannot understand that what they
are buying, what I sell and what they buy for this money. And when
I say that it is important for people and professional community to
exchange knowledge, they don’t understand it…and that is why the
problem is foreign financing." (Interview 4 Quotation # 7_113).
It can be looked at as a sort of vicious circle; the Russian government does not
generally provide steady, or in some cases any form of funding for
organisations working with issues the state considers controversial. This leads
to the fact that in order to continue their work, the organisations need to apply
for funding abroad. When they apply for funding abroad, the Ministry of Justice
targets them for inspections on the nature of their activity. If their work is seen
as political, the criteria to be included in the registry of foreign agents are met.
“[on foreign funding] unfortunately, it is the only way of getting
funding for this field.” (Interview 3 Quotation # 35_107)
"I: And what about let’s say the foreign funding was completely cut,
would you be able to work?
Y: I don’t think so, we will not be able to work. I mean in this scale
we are used to. Of course we will continue…but in very limited
way." (Interview 1 Quotation # 14_12).
In some interviews the organisations reported, that during difficult times the staff
on the NGO had continued to work, even without pay.
"They continue to work even without money. And they find other
ways to survive and to pay for rent." (Interview 9 Quotation #
23_289).
The law on foreign agents has also resulted to the organisations having to stop
applying for foreign funding. As one interviewee summarized it:
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“...no one wants to get foreign funding anymore and you can't
easily access Russian funding” (Interview 8 Quotation #: 4_252).
Flikke (2016, 121) had similar findings concerning the refusal of foreign funding.
Since it creates too much problems for the organisations the organisations, they
have started to refuse it. However, as Chapter 6.7.1 describes, the
organisations have altered their administrative bodies to better channel foreign
financing for the reason that Russian funding is not available. I would argue that
the whole picture is not the refusal of the funding, but finding new and
innovative ways to channel it. As argued in Chapter 6.2.1, the receiving Russian
funding comes under certain preconditions, but one should also take into
consideration the terms under which foreign funding is presented. As McIntosh
Sundstrom (2002, 222) argues foreign donors often offer grants for
organisations to organise projects mainly based on the donors’ aims rather than
funding projects proposed by the Russian organisations themselves. Hence
seeing foreign or Russian funding to be inherently bad or good can be a limiting
approach for the issue as a whole.
6.3 “Everything can be recognised as political activity, like
anything”
This chapter focuses on the definition of “political activity”. It is central, since it is
the other criteria to be put on the list of foreign agents. For this thesis as well as
drawing ideas from previous research, it is interesting to observe how the
organisations themselves describe political activity and how the state defines
political activity. As noted before in Chapter 3.6, there are contradicting views
on the term political, what it means and how it is defined. The definition of
political activity by the Ministry of Justice consists of e.g. participating in
organizing and carrying out public events, such as rallies, protests,
demonstrations, marches or pickets, assessing the government's decisions and
policies. This list consists nearly all functions that are inherent for an
independent civil society. Hence, the definition from the side of the state what is
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“political activity” is very broad. On the other hand, the idea that NGOs
themselves have of the meaning of the word political is very different. They
described the Russian word politika to be only about party politics and denied
that their work is in any way political (see Kulmala 2016).
6.3.1 How the organisations conceptualize the state’s definition of political
The organisations described the state’s role as active in creating a division
between politically oriented organisations and service oriented organisations.
When the Law on Foreign Agents was passed in 2012, there was no definition
of what is meant by “political activity”. This critique was perhaps noted in the
State Duma and on the 2nd of June 2016 the Ministry of Justice of Russia
published and exhaustive list19 of what is defined as political activity. As the
Amnesty International report (2016, 5) states, this amendment of defining
political activity now includes the full range of public life and almost all forms on
how to participate in it. Due to this ample definition of political activity, the law
gives the authorities a broad scope for interpretation and implementation.
"And you become more careful with what you talk about, what you
do and you become self-censored because everything can be
recognised as political activity, like anything. You have some books
in your office or you meet some officials, you organise a roundtable
discussion, you told something to the press and you become crazy,
all these thoughts about what should I do, what should I not do,
what project we can organise and which we can't. But still it doesn't
matter, in the end it doesn't matter. If they have a goal to put you on
this list, they will do it. It doesn't matter what you do." (Interview 8
Quotation # 13_259).
These interviews were conducted before the introduction of the definition of
“political activity”. It would be interesting to conduct a new round of interviews
and find out if this amendment has affected the situation. The 2016 report by
Amnesty International suggests that the amendment was mainly cosmetic. The
report suggest that even though the law excludes science, culture, art, health
19 See Chapter 1
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care social support and environmental protection, it still has not stopped
organisations working with these issues to be included on the list of foreign
agents. (Amnesty International 2016, 5.)
“…it is huge provocation from the side of the state to call political
activity all activity…but it is provocations from the state to call
everything and to blame everything which is political. Because it’s
deconstruct from the outside the third sector from inside…”
(Interview 4 Quotation # 34_140).
"...state started to repress those organisations who had some
independent view and independent resources of financing and so it
was not like this improvement like legislation lead to division of the
sector into those into black and white. Those who are supported by
the state and those who are not liked." (Interview 7 Quotation #
7_217).
Hence, the broadly defined political activity gives the state extensive powers for
the interpretation of the Law on Foreign Agents and puts the organisations
receiving foreign funding under arbitrary and unstable conditions.
6.3.2 How the organisations themselves describe political activity
“…we don’t want to take part in policy; in Russian we have the only
one word politika. Politika is a darkened, rubbish and we don’t want
to have something with it.” (Interview 4 Quotation # 34_140).
It can be understood that the organisations listed as foreign agents do not want
to define their work as political. Since the majority of them are receiving foreign
funding and if they would openly describe their work as political, their work
would meet the criteria to be included in the list of foreign agents. However, the
answers to what is seen as political creates an interesting image on the
definition of political by the organisations. It was common in the interviews for
the organisations to use examples from their, or other organisations’ work in
fields such as societal change, influencing public opinion or systematic
advocacy for interests and rights of certain groups and not defining this type of
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work as political. This comes back to the narrow definition of политика (politics)
and the organisations mainly associated this word with party politics.
“Because in Russia this word politics is very wide and it’s hard to
define, what does it mean exactly. So, sometimes very strange
activities are recognized like political. Like helping some, doing
some ecological work or… it’s very strange.” (Interview 3 Quotation
# 4_77.)
“…we do not seek any kind of state opposition or anything; we are
not running for any office. We are just informing the people what’s
going on, so that they could, when they even go to local elections,
make their election understanding what they want to improve and
what they want to remain the way it is and something. But even
then, they insisted that it was political activity.” (Interview 2
Quotation # 31_65).
“…on one of our brochures we had the word, the one that I actually
gave you, the word political [from local practices to global politics]”
so this is what they said we are involved in political activity.”
(Interview 6 Quotation # 6_176).
What Flikke (2016, 106) also noticed in his interviews with organisations listed
as a foreign agent, was that the primary aim of the NGOs was not political
mobilisation even though the Law on Foreign Agents frames them in that way.
The previous quotes demonstrate the arguments used by the organisations on
how they themselves define political activity. One interviewee had a more
critical view towards the avoiding of the term political:
“…people even in social sphere … now a lot of them are talking
about that we’re, we don’t do anything political. But they do political.
And not only state, who could do some political stuff all of us in third
sector, it is a mission of third sector to take part in policy”.
(Interview 4 Quotation # 34_140).
I would argue here that one of the main effects of this wide definition of political
activity is the division and the atmosphere of insecurity it has created among the
organisations. This division stems from the fear of inspections and the possible
inclusion to the register of foreign agents. The reasons for the organisations to
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become targeted for inspections on their “political activity” can be very diverse.
It does not necessarily have to be the mission of the organisation as such,
which is described as political, but one publication, one roundtable discussion,
one project or one piece of writing on their website what makes the organisation
to qualify as a foreign agent. This division is closely related to the self-
censorship that might follow. This definition on “political activity” is a part of the
Law on Foreign Agents and the next chapter will further discuss the legal
system and perceptions about the legal system in Russia.
6.4 “You will be a criminal just because the state decides that today I
want to create this group of criminals”
This chapter describes the legal environment for the NGOs. Nonet and Selznick
(2001) suggest law is defined by its relationship to political power. This is due to
the fact that legal systems, judiciaries and law enforcement bodies are created
and funded by political authorities. The relation of law to political powers varies
according to different kinds of societies. (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 1-17.) As
mentioned earlier, Russia has a weak legal system (Rutland 2006, 74-75) and
thus in this thesis Russia is placed in the category of repressive law. The
interviews seems to follow the same definition:
"It’s quite sad. Because it’s [third sector] facing pressures from the
government. In the last few years there was a series of laws
adopted to really limit the civil freedoms. And laws directed
specifically at NGOs, like the foreign agents law, the undesirable
foreign organisations law, number of laws to make public
assemblies more difficult to organise and so forth" (Interview 5
Quotation # 7_152.)
It is not only the law on foreign agents, which has influenced the work of NGOs,
but based on the interviews it seems to be part of a bigger trend of repressive
laws.
"From 2012, the series of repressive laws started being adopted.
There was definitely a theory that the massive protests during the
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elections scared our vertical government and so that in part was a
response to that. I mean this is a very totalitarian trend that our
government is taking … it’s comprehensive, it’s not just one or two
laws here and there it’s definitely a strategy. And it’s not only
nationally, internationally as well. Russia is downplaying the
importance of universality of human rights and promoting the
discourse of traditional values basically being higher importance to
human rights." (Interview 5 Quotation # 11_156.)
"...the first time it was a discussion if this list [of foreign agents] if
nobody will be there and people hoped that it will be like a lot of
Russian laws they created it but nobody use it. And nobody
interested in using it. But and you know what it was, this law was
adopted 2012. And then in 2013 was the first wave of this March,
spring, first really, then people understand that they will use it"
(Interview 4 Quotation # 21_127.)
The Chapter 3.6 discussed the division of the Russian civil society and the
interviews seem to follow this same idea presented e.g. by Benevolenski &
Toepler (2017) meaning that the state has its own design for a civil society and
if an organisation does not fit into that design it is under threat of being
repressed.
"It’s unpredictable and it’s unfair because we did nothing new but it
was just applied it is law to those who were not, who didn’t fit to
these new concept of civil society that prevailed." (Interview 7
Quotation # 25_235).
“…those who have influence are targeted and influenced, effected
the most by the legislation. Those who have independent position,
those who have foreign financing and those who do not only
services but some advocacy.” (Interview 7 Quotation # 9_219).
The so-called Gay Propaganda Law 20  has been especially arduous for
organisations dealing with LGBTI-rights. The law empowers anti-LGBTI people
and gives them a strong message that the state does not support LGBTI-
people. Hence, this law as along with the Law on Foreign Agents has an effect
on the public opinion. Law can be seen as the moral boundaries set by the state
20  The law which was passed in 2013 criminalises “propaganda and promotion of
homosexuality among minors”, which marginalises the LGBT-community in Russia
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and through legislation, the state gives strong signals on what is considered
wrong and what is right.
"And the law in general gave a go-ahead for these nationalist
groups, these young groups of men to be more violent towards the
LGBT-community in general" (Interview 6 Quotation # 30_200).
The NGOs reported that they see the Russian legal system as inconsistent,
partial and arbitrary. This finding supports the presupposition this thesis made
about Russia falling under the category of repressive law. The lack of
confidence in the legal system is one reason why many of the organisations
reported that they do not see the traditional ways of influencing (e.g. appealing
to the officials) to be effective.
“…we should not be aiming our efforts at so-called traditional
advocacy like policy change or legislation change. This is not
something where we should invest our efforts because it’s just not
going to happen any time soon.” (Interview 5 Quotation # 22_167).
“…the fear of people in front of the law and bureaucrats were just
so used to kind of working and living outside of the law, the laws
don't work, people think that the law doesn't work so why bother.”
(Interview 9 Quotation # 3_271).
"... people always expect that tomorrow another law, another
appear and they can do nothing. And you will be criminal just
because state decide that today I want to create this group of
criminals." (Interview 4 Quotation # 39_145).
“…since 2000 we’ve seen constant and concerted attack on the
constitution and the bringing [forward] laws, the NGOs already in
2005-2006 new laws were brought in bringing changes to NGOs
and great restrictions. So it’s government led, Putin isn’t a democrat
and the situation is increasingly getting worse and worse” (Interview
6 Quotation # 36_206).
There was also a positive undertone and some of the organisations reported
the laws to be useful in keeping themselves aware of their own shortcomings
and keeping them reforming for the better:
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"On the one hand, these repressive laws are good, because they
keep us active and pushes us to think how to continue working"
(Interview 9 Quotation # 19_285).
6.5 "Foreign agent"
The choice of wording in the Law on Foreign Agents has received international
criticism especially from the side of human rights organisations. For example,
Amnesty International has criticised the use of the term since it can be seen to
bring up memories from Stalinist repression, purges of the 1930s-1950s and
cold war era propaganda. It also fits in the bigger picture presented in the
government-controlled media, which evokes distrust in “foreign” connections
and ideas. (Amnesty International 2016, 4.)
“This foreign agents-law was about, not only about this mark,
because in the public … it has very negative meaning. It came from
the early Soviet years from 1930s when foreign agent was an
enemy, a man who want to bring some damage, spy. And it’s a
long traditions of this misunderstanding. Many people understand it
in this negative way." (Interview 3 Quotation # 30_102.)
“We were always considered inostrannie agenti [foreign agents] or
at that time the agents of the West. In 1994 there was a leaflet,
where was the logo of European commission and their logo, this
was proof for the others that these are enemies.” (Interview 9
Quotation # 8_274).
As discussed in Chapter 1.2, Harle (2000, 16) suggests that in Russia the West
and United States have been perceived to represent dangerous and detrimental
forces for Russia’s religion, values and politics. The negative connotations are
also visible in the surveys conducted by the Levada centre (see appendix 4).
The question on “What is your general perception of the phrase “foreign gent”
39% answered "A spy, intelligence officer of a different country planted in
Russia, an undercover spy" and 22% "Covert enemy from within active in
Russia in the interest of other states, a fifth column". Hence, the wording for this
law cannot be described as neural and it could be argued that it aims at
smearing this group of organisations and their work.
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6.6 “Government officials don’t want to work with foreign agents”
Cooperation was one of the central issues raised among the interviewed NGOs.
The NGOs listed as foreign agents reported an overall decrease in potential
forms and directions for cooperation. The main forms of cooperation discussed
were cooperation with other NGOs and partners in Russia, and cooperation with
state officials. As McIntosh Sundstrom (2002) notes, networks among NGOs
build a sphere, which can be seen to create a community for public discourse.
These networks are also important for their mobilisation potential in the case of
threats from the state. (McIntosh Sundstom 2002, 210.) Weigle (2000) notes
that the most central problem in accomplishing democracy in Russia is not the
absence of non-governmental organisations, but the cooperation between
NGOs and the state (Weigle 2000, 377). As the following quotes illustrate, the
cooperation between the organisations listed as foreign agents and state
officials has become nearly impossible:
"...we cannot continue this function of link between state and NGOs
because now until unofficially it’s so that foreign agents are not
somehow welcome in co-operation with state institutions."
(Interview 7 Quotation # 17_227).
"The biggest problem happens now, because since we were
registered as a foreign agent in December 2014, governmental
officials or any other people connected to the government, the
judicial system, to the police department, they do not want to
collaborate with us (…) they told me that they understand
everything, but in these circumstances they are not able to
collaborate." (Interview 1 Quotation # 10_9).
“…it is becoming dangerous and this, so we could just jeopardise
this research project because government officials don’t want to
work with foreign agents” ( Interview 3 Quotation # 12_84.)
The cooperation with other NGOs and partners in Russia was seen of high
value and “deconstruction of networks” was seen as a big challenge to be
overcome. The organisations, which had been affected by the Law on Foreign
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Agents reported to be regularly in contact with each other and share best
practises and experiences.
"…the most important is not to lose people and technologies. And
the last thing is very big because it’s more and more difficult to
establish NGO and to conduct activities and do this and so many
reasons." (Interview 7 Quotation # 18_228).
Being on the list of foreign agents makes the organisations a difficult partner to
work with. They can have a negative influence because their partners might get
in trouble for collaborating with them. Moreover, being on the list itself can
cause possible partners to retreat as demonstrated in the following quotes:
"We are as a foreign agent, if we are working together or in a
project with other organisations, if we give them some grant, some
money from …if they are not foreign agents, they will be, foreign
agents." (Interview 4 Quotation # 35_141).
“And people just stop the communication with us, partners stop
communication and financial relations just because not to be in that
list. Because it create too much difference, symbolic, financial,
problems.” (Interview 4 Quotation # 36_142).
“We get a lot of refusals from venues, but having said that there are
always new venues opening and there are people who are willing to
work with us. So it’s always uncertain.” (Interview 6 # Quotation:
41_213).
For many of the NGOs cooperation with state officials was an important part of
their work and after being included on the list of foreign agents, the
organisations are unable to continue this cooperation. This lack of cooperation
also contributes to the isolation of the part of organisations on the list of foreign
agents and further divides the third sector.
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6.7 “You think of other ways to exist”
The concrete effects to the work of NGOs are divided into two parts. The first
part 6.7.1 presents the findings of the expedients and the reasoning behind the
expedients the NGOs have taken to alter their form to work in the changing
environment. The second part 6.7.2 focuses on the concrete changes to the
everyday work of the organisations.
6.7.1 Changes in the form of the NGO
The restrictive legal and social environment is the setting where the NGOs in St.
Petersburg are operating. The organisations need to balance between keeping
up with their activities and avoiding backlashes from the authorities. Due to
mainly the problems related to the receiving of foreign funding, the NGOs have
had to develop different strategies to work in the challenging environment. The
following quote sums up the two main strategies, which were present in all the
interviews:
“…the strategy of NGOs kind of split… part of NGOs said we’re not
going to do that [register the NGO as a foreign agent], and if they
charge us with violating this law we’ll go to court, to defend
ourselves in court. Another part of NGOs said that we will liquidate
the organisation. We will not comply with this law and we will
basically close down the organisation and we will find other ways of
operating. So a number of organisations did that… we also, you
know, found other ways of operating without having to, without
being an NGO and having to comply with this law.” (Interview 5
Quotation # 8_153).
Out of nine organisations that were interviewed three had chosen to defend
themselves in court and six had changed their NGO into a more diverse legal
entity. Hence, they were doing the same activities as before, but had
administratively divided their work into different sections. These different
administrative bodies consisted of commercial entities, charities or separate
organisational bodies. This opens up a completely new and fruitful viewpoint on
the development of the organisations and the whole third sector in Russia.
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Below are listed the parts of the interviews, where the organisations talk about
this change to a different legal entity:
“…because it’s not an NGO, it’s a commercial firm, but just legally
it’s commercial. We have some very narrow, narrow number of
some services that we can provide for money, but basically it’s
usually we don’t do this work, we do everything for free.” (Interview
3 Quotation #14_86.)
“… you think about other ways to exist so we founded a commercial
company, so because commercial companies are not targeted by
this law on foreign agents and they can, they much more flexible.
So now we will operate as commercial company, probably”
(Interview 8 Quotation # 9_255).
“This organisation is no longer an NGO. Our organisation it was
founded in 2007 and at that time just because it was easier we
registered as a commercial organisation. So then in 2011 we
registered a non- commercial organisation…we always ran the
organisation through two organisations. Funds, funders can send
money to non-commercial organisation … so our NGO it existed
from 2011 to 2013” (Interview 6 Quotation # 1_171).
The main reason for the creation of a commercial part or registering the whole
NGO under a commercial legal entity appears to be that for some NGOs it is the
only way to keep their functionality. If the organisation functions only though a
commercial entity, they cannot gain access to applying for grants. However, if
the NGO has the organisation and the commercial part, they can also apply for
grants.
“…we have a legal entity in Czech Republic and we get money
from this organisation. The donors send money to our NGO in
Czech Republic and this NGO gives money for us. Very
complicated” (Interview 3 Quotation # 15_87).
The NGOs are not doing anything illegal; it is legal for the NGOs to administer a
commercial entity to their name. Some organisations even saw the change as
positive:
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"...and another positive thing for NGOs here, that people start to
create some new ideas … we start to create infrastructure which
could be more, state cannot catch you. More, flexible. Everything is
legal, official. But we create a centre in Germany, we are creating a
centre in States, we are doing commercial firm here, we try to
create and most of the NGOs they are, even if they close their first
organization who became this foreign agent, if they want to do
things which they did before, they create different body
organizational bodies, which is more, maybe not so easy to catch
from the side of our state. And sometimes it really develops your
organisation, because for example for us we always thought about
creation of some organisation, some things outside Russia, to
improve to develop our centre and now it’s just objective situation,
which forced us to do it, so maybe it’s a good for our organisation
as well" (Interview 4 Quotation # 29_135.)
“…what is also important that we don’t have only our organisation,
but we have some other holding. And so four years ago we
established a charity foundation and we also have commercial
organisation that organises some services for payment and some
commercial seminars, big conferences and so this is also important
that we have possibility to keep people and to provide them by the
work” (Interview 7 Quotation # 34_244).
The organisations, which chose to keep their original form and defend their
case in court had also heard about this other way of continuing their work, but
chose the more traditional approach. All three NGOs had the privileged of
having jurists who work for them free, which might help the situation.
Another way to avoid the criteria to be included in the list of foreign agents is to
create an initiative group. For initiative groups it is more difficult to get financing,
since only registered organisations can apply for funding, but the Law on
Foreign Agents cannot target initiative groups.
“Someone established NGOs in other countries and they try to
organise something abroad. It's expensive way, but it's also a way.
Some just don't create any legal bodies at all and they operate as
initiative group. If you don't have a legal body, you can't get
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finances and you can't get inspected by prosecutors” (Interview 8
Quotation # 19_265).
Hence, the strategies of the NGOs are mixed. As mentioned in the quote:
“…the fact that there is no unanimous effort to decide what’s to be
done and people going to different directions, they are free to go
but somehow that is the weak thing.” (Interview 2 Quotation #
38_72).
6.7.2 Changes in the work of the NGO
The most commonly reported effect on the everyday work was the increased
amount of bureaucracy and administrative resources towards e.g. court trials
and reporting about the work of the organisation. The number of annual reports
the organisations listed as foreign agents have to produce to the Ministry of
Justice is eight. For one of these reports the organisations need to employ an
outside auditor to make a report on the organisations finances and activities.
This external audit is also time-consuming and expensive. The interviewees
saw this amount of reporting as absurd and unnecessary:
"...before we were registered as foreign agent we had to once a
year produce a report about our activities…And now, we have to
produce eight reports each year." (Interview 1 Quotation # 24_22).
"This situation with these laws, they create more and more this kind
of bureaucratic challenges." (Interview 4 Quotation # 4_110).
"We managed to keep basically all our functionality, our activities,
but what it did was for about two years and it’s still ongoing … we
had to spend much more administrative resources. First it was
court battles for about 16 months and then it was basically finding
other ways of operating and changing our administrative structure
and so forth. It was a lot of administrative overhead." (Interview 5
Quotation # 9_154).
The process of registering an organisation as a foreign agent starts with
inspections from the Ministry of Justice to the nature of the organisation’s work.
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The officials can enter and inspect the organisations when they see
appropriate. The organisations reported this practice as stressful, since it was
difficult to prepare for. The organisations mentioned that the instructions
presented by the Ministry of Justice on what documents to present was very
vague. In addition, the inspections sometimes included fire inspections and
other evacuation measures as well.
"The biggest problem is that a NGO who was recognized as a
foreign agent became an object of many inspections and we have
to provide a lot of documents every three months. When we had a
first inspection, we provided 23 kilos of paper. We have everything
on our website, everything about funding, about people who work
here and so on. But they wanted more. It was not about really
inspecting us it was about making our life just impossible, to make
us not to do our work, but to prepare all these documents for the
inspection." (Interview 3 Quotation # 31_103).
"What you need to be aware of, how to organise your documents
so, that you are ready for the inspections. One example, the
organisations share with each other their experiences because
what is really bad that these inspections, urgent inspections,
nobody knew especially when it started three years ago. Nobody
knew how and what and so on. So organisations also share what
happened and because it’s very hidden all this information.
(Interview 7 Quotation # 15_225)"
The inspections and the arbitrary legal environment create an atmosphere of
fear for the organisations:
"And you become more careful with what you talk about, what you
do and you become self-censored." (Interview 8 Quotation #
13_259).
"…there is a self-censorship that is in place." (Interview 9 Quotation
# 11_277).
"…it’s very bad because it’s mistrust, it is waiting for inspections
that could come from any prosecutor’s office, ministry of justice, tax
inspection, labour inspection, fire inspection so it’s like that, you
never know it’s almost, it’s very difficult to work in this stress,
stressy, stressy environment." Interview 7 Quotation # 23_233).
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"I think that the most important thing which happened, you feel
yourself unprotected… for me honestly connected with this fear to
do something wrong for your organisation. You don’t know really
what could be used against you, any of your words could be and
that is why you appear this feeling, maybe I shouldn’t talk to others,
maybe I shouldn’t do something in public or pretend in public."
(Interview 4 Quotation # 25_131).
"And you now it lead to burnout of some activists, emotional
professional burnout. But we survived." (Interview 5 Quotation #
19_164).
The mental effects the Law on Foreign Agents has to the work of the NGOs are
important to take into consideration. There have been reports about self-
censorship in the context of the media, but not so much about organisations
working in repressive environments. One interviewee used the term “desperate
patriot” to describe this conflict between the aim to do good for the country, but
the struggle it can be when the work environment is repressive.
6.8 “I don’t really know how to deal with all these official people who
are coming to your office. Sometimes very aggressively”
This chapter discusses the problems and misconducts by the State officials. All
the organisations that were interviewed had faced some problems with Russian
officials, most frequently the Ministry of Justice. The most commonly mentioned
incidents included checks done by the government officials. These checks were
most frequently related to fire inspections or related to checks to the paperwork
done by the organisation. The inspections can also be related to tax issues,
labour inspections, inspection of reporting in general, inspection of using the
term foreign agent on all publications or inspection of funding. These
inspections were reported to cause a lot of stress for the employees of the
NGOs. The checks were not always notified of in advance. The NGOs reported
that in the beginning they did not know what types of documents they need to
prepare in order to avoid troubles with the officials. The organisations kept
informing others on how to deal with these unexpected checks.
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"I do not know what are the procedures, what are the limits of my
activity and their and what they should do and what I should do and
it is fear to do something wrong which our state authority will use
against my organisation. And it is very strong fear. (Interview 4
Quotation # 23_129)
"...inspections, sometime they took computers, without any, they
didn’t have the right to take but they took it. (Interview 4 Quotation #
24_130)"
“…every day we understand that there will be some new inspection
that will destroy us economically because this is the biggest threat,
risk now that those sudden inspections they can control everything
and choose something and make fines.” (Interview 7 Quotation #
32_242)
The inspections are taken very seriously since the fines can be so big that if
issued, they can force the organisation to close down. This creates a lot stress
for the people working at the organisation. The inspections were generally seen
as arbitrary and directed at disturbing the actual work of the NGOs, rather than
being justified for the goals of the legislation.
The organisations also mentioned clear misconducts of procedures by the
Ministry of Justice and by other authorities:
"...when they invited me let’s say to come to their office at three
o’clock on a certain day. But the letter, in which they invited me to
their office was mailed three days after the day of our meeting. And
it arrived, it was mailed according to the seal on this letter, but that,
it arrived six days later. Meanwhile, they started suing me for not
coming on time in court. (Interview 2 Quotation # 22_56)"
"…they stopped me at the airport, they deprived me of my
computer, my iPad, my eleven memory sticks... They suspected
that I was taking out of the country some state secrets and they
investigated that for more than ten months.” (Interview 2 Quotation
# 12_47)"
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"[Vitaly] Milonov in 2013 Molodaya Gvadi this youth organisation
pro-Putin, they set us up basically, they sent 17-year-olds to our
screening" (Interview 6 Quotation # 28_198)
“The information that they used against the organisation was
actually concerning grants that we had received prior to the passing
of the law, so even though Russian laws are not to be
backdated…they actually used grants that we received prior to the
passing of the law” (Interview 6 Quotation # 6_176).
Hence based on the preceding quotes, misconducts by the authorities do
happen and they contribute to the arbitrariness of the work environment of the
organisations.
6.9 “One eye in paradise and one eye in hell”
This chapter presents the organisations’ views on the future. The views are
listed by positive views, negative views, mixed views and possible ideas for
future improvements within the NGOs.
Some NGOs saw the future as positive. This was a result of the organisations
having to develop their skills to be able to work in the unstable environment.
This pressure has made the organisations to think profoundly about their work
and their ways of operating.
"…the sector it’s different than it was 20 years ago and there is a lot
of competent, professional NGOs who think about profoundly how
to go on and continue their activities." (Interview 7 Quotation #
14_224).
The common undertone was to survive and to continue the work no matter the
circumstances. The NGOs saw their work as valuable and worth continuing,
which gives them strength and purpose to continue their work.
"…these dangerous and difficult circumstances but we will continue
of course, until the very end. I still think that we are doing valuable
things and we are, let’s say, on the side of the angels. And this
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means that we will win, not maybe tomorrow" (Interview 1
Quotation # 41_37).
"We don’t have any choice but to go on in our work because it’s
good, good to do this work. Until we can we will do this and we will
see, like human rights defenders say that “do what you can and
what you are supposed to do and what will happen will happen”
(Interview 7 Quotation # 36_246).
"The whole thing don’t look very optimistic but we try to be
optimistic, we’ll carry on. I think we’ll carry on, we’ll try to maximise
our work within the context and the possibilities and the resources
we have." (Interview 6 Quotation # 37_207.
The negative views were related to the idea that in order for the third sector to
become more enabling, it would need big institutional reforms, which require
time.
"I think that it can change if only, if we will have another president
and another government, no way it can be improved in some other
ways. I think that the next five or even more years the situation will
become worse." (Interview 3 Quotation # 29_101).
The uncertainty was also present in the views on the future:
“…all this situation, two or three years, last two-three years it’s
really changed for the third sector and it could destroy it or it could
make it stronger” (Interview 4 Quotation # 10_116).
The main goals for improvement within the NGOs were focused on better
working for their target groups in building and actual third sector responding to
people’s real needs:
“…we should create real civil society and it means that not only that
people likes us, but people understand that they want to donate for
different public interests, for different interest of society, which
serve this NGO. And openly take part as volunteers and give some
money, give some resources to these organisations. But I think in
Russia we need time to do it. People really have to understand that
they really need that.” (Interview 4 Quotation # 32_138).
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“And the other [challenge] is to try to change public opinion. There
is this, what’s called moveable middles, the segment of population
that’s actually open to information and is not zombiefied by the
government propaganda. And we should aim our efforts at them”
(Interview 5 Quotation # 23_168).
As discussed in Chapter 6.1, the organisations mentioned that not many of
them work well for their target audiences. As seen in the quotes above, the
criticism seems to be noted and the organisations are aware of this
shortcoming. Outreach projects require resources, hence it might take time for
the organisations to reach these goals.
6.10 Potentials for change
In the last part of the analysis, the whole data was coded anew with Atlas.ti to
identify the potentials for change. These codes were characteristic stresses,
problems, opportunities, expectations and emergent adaptations.
Whilst going into this part of analysis using the framework provided by Nonet
and Selznick, I noticed Malcom Feeley’s criticism to be relevant. It was relevant
on the part that questioned the level of analysis by Nonet & Selznick’s model is
meant to be used. Is it meant for analysing substance, style or neither? As
Feeley noted earlier, by failing to distinguish the levels of analysis, the authors
fail to make problematic the central focus of their investigation. In his view, this
contributes to the lack of analytical power. The framework of repressive law can
and is used here to describe Russia’s preconditions, but it does not provide
such a useful analytical tool.
To produce a more tangible synopsis of the main findings, I chose to use the
helpful characteristics of the developmental model of bureaucracy, on which
Nonet and Selznick have based their tripartation to three types of law. Nonet
and Selznick state that the main function of a useful developmental model is to
identify potentials for change. Hence, a developmental model of bureaucracy
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proposes that in certain stages a system will generate forces leading to
specified changes. As stated, it is helpful if it successfully identifies
characteristic stresses, problems, opportunities, expectations and emergent
adaptations. These may and do suggest the direction of change, but they
cannot tell what will actually happen, since that always depends on widely
varying conditions. (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 23.) This is the idea I chose to
follow-up on and why I chose the codes: characteristic stresses, problems,
opportunities, expectations and emergent adaptations.
As Nonet and Selznick note, the key function of a developmental model in
social enquiry is to help detect the capacities and weaknesses of institutions
and assess the potentials for the realisation of values (Nonet & Selznick 2001,
9). Hale (2002, 311) also notes that the choice of a model for investigating a
certain phenomenon inevitably involves trade-offs. Hale suggests, that analysts
are advised to state their preconditions probabilistically, recognise the inherent
complexity of politics and the unforeseen events that influence politics.
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Table 1. Potentials for change
Characteristic
stresses
Problems Opportunities Expectations Emergent
adaptations
Unstable,
repressive
environment
Low-
awareness
among public
of universal
rights
Division of the
third sector
Lack of public
support
Suspicion of
“Western”
influence
Increased
bureaucracy
Unlikely
access to
Russian
funding
Organisations’
lack of
knowledge of
their target
groups’ needs
Obstruction to
collaborate
with officials
State’s biased
promotion of
traditional
values over
universal
values
Mental effects;
Fear, stress,
uncertainty
Feeling of lack
of influence
over future
developments
over strong
state
Self-
censorship
Better
involving the
public in
organisations’
work has
reduced
prejudice,
appealing to
the “moveable
middles”
Repressive
legislation
forces the
organisations
to develop
their skills
Good
connections
and networks
are in place
NGOs more
professional
than 20 years
ago
To continue
to work no
matter what
Situation will
become
worse
Situation will
become more
unpredictable
Valuable
work will be
rewarding at
some point
Process of
overall
improvement
will take time
Founding of
an additional
commercial
entity/charity/
organisational
body
Closing down
the
organisation
and working
through a
commercial
company
Legal
proceedings
Service-
provision for
NGOs to
better cope
with the
changing
situation
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The preceding Table 1 on potentials for change contributes to two main issues:
it presents the most central findings from the empirical data in a concise way
and aims at identifying what are the persistent (characteristic stresses) and new
limitations (problems) and emergent adaptations. In addition, the main
expectations and opportunities described by the organisations are listed to give
an idea of where the possibilities for improvement may lay and in what way, or if
any, the organisations will continue working and how do they depict the future
ahead. This table follows the previous findings, but it also brings forth new
ideas. The characteristic stresses and problems noted similar issues as e.g.
Hale (2002), McIntosh Sundstrom (2002), Benevolenski and Toepler (2017) and
Flikke (2016). However, this table also introduces new findings to take into
consideration, such as the mental effects of the repressive legislation on the
organisations, self-censorship and the emergent adaptation of changing the
form of the organisation.
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7. Discussion
The aim of this thesis was to identify the effects of the law and expedients by
organisations in St. Petersburg, which have become subjects of the Law on
Foreign Agents. This task included listing the concrete impacts to the work, but
also a description by the organisations on environment where they are working.
Arguably, the main findings in this thesis were the changes in the structure of
these organisations. Five out of nine organisations had changed from being a
“traditional” NGO to having some form of commercial or other entity through
which they also function. One of the organisations had completely changed the
form from an NGO to a commercial company, but the work was still done in the
framework of civil society and human rights. This brings up a discussion on
what kinds of forms can the third sector take and still be categorised as
separate from the state and business. As previously defined, in the framework
of the UN an NGO is: a private body that is independent from the government
control, not seeking to challenge governments by presenting itself as a political
party, nor having a narrow focus on human rights, not working for profit and not
involved in criminal activity (UN 1945). Based on the empirical findings of this
thesis and previous research, I would argue that the forms the third sector can
take is a very topical question, and will perhaps become even more relevant
over time. Heerad Sabeti (2011) has introduced in this paper “The for-benefit
enterprise” the idea of a fourth sector, which operates in many ways like a
traditional business, but is founded primarily to provide social benefits rather
than to maximise financial returns (Sabeti 2011, 5). Out of the five NGOs, which
had established a commercial entity only one had completely shut down the
NGO, while the others continued to operate through two or more administrative
bodies. Sabeti’s focus is more on “creating enterprises that combine a social
mission with a business engine”, hence his focus is more on businesses, which
aim at societal change. (Sabeti 2011, 7). The idea of a fourth sector, which
challenges the division of the sectors and finds profitable synergies for all would
be a fruitful approach for further research.
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In the case of NGOs in St. Petersburg, the change from a “traditional” NGO into
a more complex administrative body was seen as necessary and even in a
positive light by some organisations. The positive comments were related to the
flexibility and security of the organisation. The organisations reported that they
were considering of founding different legal entities in possibly different
countries even before the legislation pushed them further in that direction.
When the organisation is only working through one administrative body, they
have “all their eggs in one basket”. Meaning if they have problems with the one
entity they have, it might result in closing down the whole organisation.
Moreover, having separate administrative bodies helps the organisations to
channel the foreign financing in a way that the state cannot hold them
accountable for receiving foreign financing. This is all done in legal ways and as
one NGO described it, the goal is to make the structure of the organisation
more flexible. Financing has a very central role in the third sector in St.
Petersburg. As described in Chapter 6.2, foreign financing not only can create
misunderstandings about the work of the NGOs, but it is vital for the upholding
of the work of the NGOs who do not receive funding from the Russian state.
This results in the organisations having to look for funding from abroad, which
makes them a target for inspections for the nature of their work. If the work is
found to be political, the prerequisites to be labelled a foreign agent are present.
The three organisations, which did not choose to create separate administrative
bodies, chose the way to purely representing their cases in court. The
organisations, which had established a different administrative body, were also
facing court battles to exclude themselves from the list of foreign agents, hence
the expedients had a mixed character. The main reason for the trials was that
the organisations were opposing the fines they received for not registering
voluntarily as a foreign agent. One of the organisations had managed to remove
itself from the list of foreign agents and it was done through legal proceedings.
The other main finding was that the organisations reported a high level of
uncertainty related to their work environment due to arbitrary legislation and the
repressive policies. As Uhlin states, civil society requires a public space, which
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is independent from the state and has the ability to organise within it to
influence the exercise of state power (Uhlin 2006, 23). In Russia, the public
space seems to be shrinking and the organisations felt they have little or no
influence on the state’s policies. Moreover, Uhlin added that civil society cannot
be completely autonomous from the state (ibid. 24). This highlights the
importance of the issues presented in Chapter 3.6 on the state and civil society
relations in Russia. One cannot ignore the extremely central role the state plays
in creating the space for civil society.
The growing division of the third sector emphasises the state’s active role in civil
society functions in St. Petersburg. It was reported that the state actively
pushes the third sector into two directions; it prefers the socially-oriented
organisations and discriminates the advocacy-oriented organisations. The state
funds more the socially/service oriented organisations while systematically
neglects funding the “politically oriented” organisations. This creates a divide
and also deconstructs the third sector form the inside. The organisations start
avoiding the use of the idea of doing something political, even though societal
impact is one of the main goals of civil society.
The lack of public support and low level of awareness of the role and function of
civil society was seen in the statistics by the Levada centre and Aleksateri
Institute. This was related to various issues connected to the history, biased
media reporting and representation of the west as something corrupt.
As Nysten-Haarala (2001, 4) has stated, in the Soviet times the state was the
ultimate source of law and law was a tool in the hands of the ruling elites.
Looking at the trend of repressive legislation starting from 2004, the democratic
development of Russia seems to take steps towards the Soviet times. All the
organisations (in line with international human rights organisations such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) reported the Law on Foreign
Agents to be discriminatory, repressive and mainly aimed at targeting those
organisations, which have influence and foreign funding. On the one hand, the
concept of civil society po-russki (Ljubownikov et al. 2013) could be applicable
in the sense that based on the findings of this thesis, it does seem that the
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organisations working under the Law on Foreign Agents are developing new
and innovative ways of continuing their work. On the other hand, Hale (2002)
criticised the division to “Russian” and “Western” models of civil society, which
simplifies the differences within both scholarly traditions. It is not of interest to
explore weather a “real civil society” is developing in Russia. Hale contends,
that observing state-society relations is a fruitful approach on discussing
different patterns (Hale 2002, 306-307.) I would agree that the search of a “real
civil society” is a very limiting approach. Rather, it is more productive to observe
emergent adaptations and state-society relations, which I have also attempted
to cover in my work. Ljubownikov et al. (2013) note that after the failure to
import Western style civil society, it seems that Russian civil society activists
are becoming increasingly comfortable with the idea of a civil society po-russki
as the framework in which they can operate (Ljubownikov et al 2013, 164). This
idea does not necessarily contradict with Hale’s (2002) critique on the Western
vs. Russian models of civil society. I would argue that the civil society po-russki
is something completely new, hence it does not ignore Russian scholarly
traditions and simplify what is “Russian”. The repressive laws act as a driving
force for NGOs to find new ways to operate and survive in the new concept of
civil society that is prevailing.
Nonet and Selznick also that repression is a “natural” response to certain
stages of legal and social formation and there are conditions under which it was
perhaps wiser, maybe necessary course of institutional evolution, if only
because no practical alternative was available (Nonet and Selznick 2001, 25).
Nonet and Selznick convincingly argue that the essence of repressive law is
moralism and ultimately its appeal is derived not from fear, but from the premise
that only through the use of efficient exercise of force can the security and
morality of social order be preserved (Feeley 1979, 900).
It is important to address the limitations of and critique towards the scholarly
approaches in this thesis. The organisations working as foreign agents are only
a small fraction of the Russian civil society as a whole and the question can be
raised of the importance of this small group and small sample. At a first glance,
the Law on Foreign Agents seems to have affected only a fraction of the third
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sector in Russia21. If solely looking at the numbers this truly is the case. Yet this
group of organisations has attracted wide international attention and has been
under pressure from the side of the Russian state. The following quote suggest
one possible view on why this small group of NGOs can be seen as important:
“…those who have influence are targeted and effected the most by
the legislation. Those who have independent position, those who
have foreign financing and those who do not only services but
some advocacy.” (Interview 7 Quotation # 9_219).
Hence, the group of foreign agents is a small, but an important part of the
Russian civil society. It can been seen to be targeted for the potential they
possess, their good international connections and potential for bringing
improvements to the third sector in Russia. As mentioned in some of the
interviews, the organisations saw that the Russian state was repressing these
organisations to prevent the potential “Colour Revolutions”, which was reported
in the eyes of the organisations as one of the main threats towards Putin’s rule.
Moreover, in relation to the small sample used in this thesis, I would argue that
even if we are talking about a small group of organisations, they create an
example for the other NGOs working in the same sector. The repression they
face might not only contribute to their own self-censorship but to the self-
censorship of other organisations who are trying to avoid being added to the list
of foreign agents. This effect also contributes to the lack of trust of the
separation of powers working in Russia and giving the state a Janus face.
As Cohen and Arato note, movements that can be easily restrained cannot play
an important role in overcoming resistance to reform, while those that can play
such a role cannot be controlled and are unpredictable in the eyes of the state.
In the Soviet Union there was a fluctuation between measures that lead forward
and those that revive past practices. The regime wanted radical reform and
unleashed the revival of civil society, but it also wanted to press its prerogative
to determine the limits of what can and cannot be changed, including the
21 Out of approximately 226 000 organisations 115 organisations are currently (15.4.2017) listed as a
foreign agents
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structure and dynamics of the civil society itself. (Cohen & Arato 1992, 63.) This
idea is relevant to describe the practises by the Russian state; civil society as
such is not inherently bad, as long as it stays within government control.
The developmental model of different types of legal orders as stages of
evolution (Nonet & Selznick 2001, 18) was the analytical tool I chose to achieve
a better understanding of the state (law)-society relations. The model was
useful for placing Russia in a specific category of law, but the analytical power
of this model was lacking. As presented in Chapter 6.10 it allowed me to create
a concise listing of the central findings of the thesis in a form of potentials for
change. As Nonet & Selznick note, the key function of a developmental model
in social enquiry is to help detect the capacities and weaknesses of institutions
and assess the potentials for the realisation of values. For this purpose, it was
quite useful, but a different theoretical approach e.g. linking the empirical
findings to political theories such as social movement theory, Habermasian22
approach, consider the framework of the “Dual state”23 by Richard Sakwa or
even a more historical analysis on e.g. critical junctures24.
McIntosh Sundstrom (2002) argues that in order to increase the strength of
democratic procedures and institutions NGOs should possess certain qualities.
These qualities include autonomy from the state manipulation of activities
(certain amount of state funding is acceptable), knowledge of and
communication/collaboration with other NGOs working with similar issues,
outreach to relevant constituencies and the possibility to turn to the state and
government institutions to advocate for improvements in public policy, when
needed. (McIntosh Sundstrom 2002, 209-210.) Out of these qualities, the law
on foreign agents has effected negatively on all the mentioned necessary
qualities. The communication between the NGOs working as foreign agents is
the only mentioned quality that that the organisations working in St. Petersburg
reported as active.
22  e.g. Habermas, Jürgen (1987) 'Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: The Federal
Republic's Orientation to the West'.
23 Sakwa, Richard (2011) The crisis of Russian democracy: the dual state, factionalism and the
Medvedev succession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24 Soifer, Hillel David  (2012) The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures. Comparative Political
Studies, 45:12, 1572–1597.
87
The point of a developmental model is to ground the recognition of essential or
emerging values in the analysis of historical stresses and opportunities (Nonet
& Selznick 2001, 25) and based on this thought the model in Chapter 6.10 was
created based on the empirical findings. Analysing the table “Potentials for
change”, the key element seems to be how to survive in the changing situation.
There is a lack of trust in the traditional ways of influencing the state via
advocacy. The Law on Foreign Agents has isolated the group of NGOs in the
sense that not being able to collaborate with state officials has changed the
ways of working for the NGOs. There is a faint positive undertone, which relates
on the one hand to the notion that the repressive law forces the NGOs to
develop. On the other hand, the NGOs have a strong personal feeling that their
work is valuable and they see their work as a mission for the general good. This
notion helps to keep them adapting and continuing their work.
A stated in the introductory chapter, Russia is not the only country that has
adopted repressive legislation towards NGOs, but rather it is a global trend to
silence independent voices in non-democratic regimes. From the beginning of
2017, China adopted the “Law on Management of Domestic Activities of
Overseas Non-governmental Organizations”, which forces foreign NGOs
working in China to submit to greater government control if they wish to
continue their work in China. NGO experts have said that this law is mainly
targeted at NGOs working in fields such as human rights and the rule of law
(Huang 2017). The difference between these two laws is, that when the foreign
agents law is targeted at Russian NGOs, the Chinese law targets foreign
organisations working in China. The Chinese law also demands more reporting
from the organisations, which receive foreign funding or collaborate with
international NGOs (ICNL 2017). The interesting finding is that the majority of
foreign NGOs in China have changed their forms to businesses or are
functioning without a registration at all (Huang 2017). There was a similar
direction to be seen within the NGOs in Russia, to develop in the way that the
boundaries between NGOs and commercial companies might become blurred.
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There are various possibilities for future research on the topic, but based on the
findings of this thesis here the main interest for future research would be related
to these “blurring boundaries” between sectors and the possible idea of a
“fourth sector”. For the organisations, it might be beneficial to study more the
needs and ways to reach to their target groups. This was reported as one
obstacle for the Russian third sector to grow and get the general public on its
side.
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8. Conclusions
This thesis has brought forward its contribution of new knowledge on the
adaptations the organisations working under the Law on Foreign agents have
taken to continue their work. It has also discussed the characteristics of the
work environment of these organisations.
The NGOs, which receive foreign funding and promote non-traditional Russian
values or advocacy are working under great pressure from the side of the
government. The Law on Foreign Agents has not done what it has officially
been described to be used for - creating a more transparent third sector in
Russia. Instead, it has created many troublesome and hard-to-meet criteria for
the organisations, which have become its subjects. These limitations affect the
everyday work of the organisations, take up time from their actual projects, and
contribute to an environment of self-censorship. The reporting demands were
seen by all interviewed as unnecessary and burdensome. This does not mean
that the NGOs should be able to work without being monitored, the current
criteria just seems to be too demanding considering the workload it creates.
The problem is also with the term foreign agent. Its strong connotations cannot
be ignored when looking at how the law has affected the NGOs. Being referred
to as a foreign agent can cause misunderstandings both in the cooperating
party as well as the general public. Since the term needs to be included also in
all the publications produced by the NGOs listed as foreign agents, it causes
problems with credibility among the Russian audience. On the other hand,
within the international community it seems that being listed as a foreign agent
proves that the organisation is doing something interesting. Since the
organisation is critical towards the government, it is not being controlled by it.
The law makes it difficult for the organisations to cooperate with international,
national and state actors. If the organisation stays on the list of foreign agents, it
must meet the burdensome reporting that takes time from the actual work. If
they manage to leave the list, the organisation has to give up all foreign funding
or stop the “political activity”. To the day, the only organisation in St. Petersburg,
which managed to remove itself from the list managed to do this at the time
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when they were not receiving foreign funding. This means that they could object
to both the funding and “political activity”. Currently, there are NGOs defending
their cases in court who have foreign financing but try to prove that their work is
not political. The process is still ongoing. This can be difficult, since for the
NGOs, which are working in the field of e.g. human rights, it is very hard to
receive funding from Russian sources. Giving up foreign funding can result in
serious financial problems and even in closing down the NGO. The only way to
get off the list of foreign agents is to give up foreign funding completely. The
other way to do it would be to stop the so-called political activity. Since political
activity is very broadly defined in the law it is quite difficult for the NGOs working
in fields such as human rights, freedom of media, freedom of information or
election monitoring to not have their work categorised as political.
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the most significant findings of this thesis were
related to the new forms the organisations have had to take in order to navigate
in the repressive environment. These developments bring up various
discussions on not only the form of NGOs, but the civil society/third sector in
general.
In January 2016 I attended a seminar on Emerging needs for and forms of
NGOs in contemporary Russia. In the final session there was a discussion on
why the state does not simply close down all the organisations they see as
detrimental for the status quo and possible threats for starting colour
revolutions. One participant replied using a concept of “a useful enemy”. By this
she meant that it is useful for the state to have enemies to point to when the
country faces hardships. In this way, having organisations in the country who
are called foreign agents can be used in various narratives by the state. If the
state would simply close down all critical NGOs they would not have this
advantage and would have to answer to more critique. As the saying goes,
“There is only one thing more useful in politics than having the right friends, and
that is having the right enemies”25.
25 Anonymous, Economist 375: 8432 (25 June 2005), p. 84
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As one interviewee put it:
“They are sometimes told that they should close as well, because
by functioning they allow the power to keep its human face. It's the
logic of the worst the better26”
26 A phrase used by Nikolay Chernyshevsky
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List of appendices
Appendix 1: NGOs on the list of foreign agents
1. Association of NGOs in Defense of Voters’ Rights “Golos” (Moscow) – June 5, 2014
2. Regional Public Association in Defense of Democratic Rights and Freedoms “Golos”
(Moscow) – June 5, 2014
3. Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies (Saratov) – June 5, 2014 (the organization
was shut down – May 22, 2015)
4. Women of Don (Rostov region) – June 5, 2014 (“foreign agent” status was suspended –
February 29, 2016)
5. Kostroma Center for Support of Public Initiatives (Kostroma) – June 5, 2014 (“foreign
agent” status was suspended – June 19, 2015)
6. Interregional Human Rights Association “Agora” (Kazan) – July 21, 2014 (the
organization was shut down – December 29, 2016)
7. Regional public organization “Ecozaschita! – Womens’ Council” (Kaliningrad) – July  21,
2014
8. Public Verdict Foundation (Moscow) – July 21, 2014
9. Human Rights Center “Memorial” (Moscow) – July 21, 2014
10. Lawyers for Constitutional Rights and Freedoms / JURIX (Moscow) – July 21, 2014 (the
organization was shut down – May 26, 2015)
11. Soldiers’ Mothers (Saint Petersburg) – August 28, 2014 (“foreign agent” status was
suspended – October 23, 2015)
12. Freedom of Information Foundation / Institute for Information Freedom Development –
 August 28, 2014
13. PIR Center – September 3, 2014 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – February 24,
2016)
14. Association “Partnership for Development” (Saratov) – October 2, 2014 (the
organization was shut down – November 6, 2015)
15. “News Agency MEMO.RU” (Moscow) – November 20, 2014
16. Regional Press Institute (St. Petersburg) – November 20, 2014
17. Moscow School of Civic Education – December 9, 2014
18. Rakurs, Arkhangelsk regional non-governmental LGBT organization – December 15,
2014
19. All-Russian movement "For Human Rights" – December 22, 2014 (“foreign agent”
status was suspended – December 30, 2015)
20. Human Rights Center (Kaliningrad) – December 25, 2014
21. Krasnodar Regional Social Organization of University Alumni – December 25,
2014 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – April 22, 2016)
22. Regional social organization "Public Commission for Academic Sakharov's Heritage
Preservation" – December 25, 2014
23. Resource Human Rights Center (St. Petersburg) – December 30, 2014 (the
organization was shut down – November 3, 2015)
24. Regional Public Organization "Man and the Law" (Republic of Mari El) – December 30,
2014
25. Center for Social Development "Vozrozhdeniye" (Pskov) – December 30, 2014 (the
organization was shut down – January 31, 2017)
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26. Public Human Rights Organization "Civil Control" (St. Petersburg) – December 30,
2014
27. The League of Women Voters (St. Petersburg) – December 30, 2014 (the organization
was shut down – May 22, 2015)
28. Free Press Support Foundation – December 30, 2014
29. Interregional Non-Governmental Organization "The Committee Against Torture" –
 January 16, 2015 (the organization was shut down – September 13, 2016)
30. Educational Center "Memorial" (Sverdlov region) – January 16, 2015
31. Autonomous non-profit human rights organization "Youth Center for Consulting and
Training" – January 20, 2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – July 22, 2015)
32. "Information Bureau of the Nordic Council of Ministers in St. Petersburg" – January 20,
2015
33. Jewish regional branch of the Russian public organization "Municipal Academy"–
January 26, 2015 (the organization was shut down – May 22, 2015)
34. The noncommercial partnership "Press Development Institute - Siberia" – January 30,
2015
35. Center for social, psychological and legal help to victims of discrimination and
homophobia “Maximum” (Murmansk) – February 4, 2015 (the organization was shut
down – October 28, 2015)
36. Interregional public fund for civil society development “Golos-Povolzhye” (Samara) –
February 6, 2015
37. Interregional charity organization “Siberian Environmental Center” (Novosibirsk) –
 February 12, 2015
38. Center for Civic Analysis and Independent Research / GRANI (Perm) – February 13,
2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – June 19, 2015)
39. Municipal public organization “Samara Center for Gender Studies” (Samara) – February
16, 2015
40. Regional Fund "Center for Defense of Mass Media Rights" (Voronezh) – February 26,
2015
41. Regional Charitable Social Foundation "For nature" (Chelyabinsk) – March 6, 2015
42. Regional Ecological Social Movement "For nature" (Chelyabinsk) –  March 6, 2015
43. Humanist Youth Movement (Murmansk) – March 13, 2015 (the organization was shut
down – August 25, 2015)
44. Regional Social Organization for Contribution to Harmonization of Interethnic Relations
"Azerbaijan" – March 13, 2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – July 22, 2016)
45. Regional Social Environmental Organization "Bellona-Murmansk" – March 19,
2015 (the organization was shut down – October 16, 2015)
46. "Educational Center for Environment and Security" (Samara) – March 20,
2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – October 8, 2015)
47. Foundation "Migration XXI Century" – March 27, 2015 (“foreign agent” status was
suspended – November 25, 2016)
48. Eco-logika (Rostov) – April 3, 2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – March 30,
2016)
49. Transparency International Russia - April 7, 2015
50. Social Environmental Organization "Planeta Nadezhd" – April 15, 2015
51. Foundation for Consumers' Rights Defense (Novosibirsk) – April 17, 2015 (the
organization was shut down – May 12, 2016)
52. Civic Assistance Committee – April 20, 2015
53. Foundation 19/29 -  Foundation for Support of Investigative Journalism – April 24, 2015
54. Commemorative Centre of History of Political Repressions "Perm - 36" –  April 29,
2015 (the organization was shut down – August 18, 2016)
55. Women's League (Kaliningrad ) – April 29, 2015 (the organization was shut down –
December 16, 2015)
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56. Legal Expert Partnership "Soyuz " – May 7, 2015 (the organization was shut down –
 25 August 2015)
57. Center for Development of Non-Commerical Organizations – May 13, 2015
58. Club of Accountants and Auditors of Non-Commercial Organizations – May 13,
2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – March 30, 2016)
59. Informational Bureau of the Council of Ministers of Northern Countries (Kaliningrad) –
 May 13, 2015
60. Sutyajnik (Yekaterinburg) – May 15, 2015
61. Human Rights Academy (Yekaterinburg) – May 15, 2015
62. Ecological Center "Dront" (Nizhny Novgorod) – May 22, 2015
63. The non-profit organization "Liberal Mission" Scientific Foundation of Theoretical and
Applied Research – May 25, 2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – September
11, 2015)
64. The non-profit Dynasty Foundation – May 25, 2015
65. Union of Employers (Tula region) – May 28, 2015 (“foreign agent” status was
suspended – December 13, 2016)
66. Youth organization "Nuori Karjala/Young Karelia" – June 19, 2015 (the organization
was shut down – March 25, 2016)
67. Siberian Center for Support of Social Initiatives – June 19, 2015 (“foreign agent” status
was suspended – September 21, 2016)
68. Interregional Social Foundation for Peace in the South and in the Northern Caucasus –
 June 19, 2015
69. Informational Center "Free Inform" – June 22, 2015 (the organization was shut down –
 June 21, 2016)
70. Center for Independent Sociological Studies (St. Petersburg) – June 22, 2015
71. Regional Organization for Population and Development  – June 23, 2015
72. Geblerov Ecological Societ (Barnaul) – June 23, 2015
73. Association “Legal Basis” (Yekaterinburg) – July 3, 2015
74. Interregional Non-governmental Organization "Northern Environmental Coalition"
(Petrozavodsk) – July 8, 2015 (the organization was shut down – December 1, 2015)
75. Komi Human Rights Commission "Memorial" (Syktyvkar) – July 21, 2015
76. Altai Regional Public Fund for 21st Century Altai (Barnaul) – July 22, 2015 (the
organization was shut down – March 28, 2016)
77. Interregional Public Foundation for Civil Society Development "GOLOS-Ural"
(Chelyabinsk region) – July 22, 2015
78. SREDA Foundation – July 28, 2015
79. Non-governmental environmental organization "Green World" (Nizhny Novgorod) – July
29, 2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – October 28, 2016)
80. Civic Action Foundation (Perm) – August 5, 2015
81. Alliance of Funds of Local Communities of the Perm territory – August 11,
2015 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – October 26, 2016)
82. Kabardino-Balkaria Human Rights Center – regional branch of the “For Human Rights”
All-Russian movement (Nalchik) – August 18, 2015 (the organization was shut down –
November 6, 2015)
83. The Human Rights Center of the Chechen Republic (Grozny) – August 21, 2015
84. Interregional Social Ecological Foundation "ISAR-Siberia" (Novosibirsk) – August 26,
2015
85. Perm Regional Human Rights Center (Perm) – September 3, 2015
86. Siberia's lifeline (Novosibirsk) – September 3, 2015
87. Golos Foundation in Support of Democracy – September 4, 2015 (the organization
was shut down – June 21, 2016)
88. Jewish Cultural Center "Hesed-Teshuva" (Ryazan) – September 11, 2015 (“foreign
agent” status was suspended – December 13, 2016)
102
89. Sakhalin Environment Watch (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk) – September 18, 2015
90. Yasavey Manzara Information and Research Center (Naryan-Mar) – September 23,
2015 (the organization was shut down – June 15, 2016)
91. Consumer Rights and Environment Protection Association "Princip" (Moscow region) –
October 5, 2015
92. Far East Center for the Development of Civil Initiatives and Social Partnership
(Vladivostok)– October 13, 2015
93. Russian Research Center for Human Rights – October 20, 2015
94. Women of the Don (Rostov region) – October 27, 2015
95. Friends of the Siberian Forests (Krasnoyarsk) – October 28, 2015 (the organization
was shut down – December 6, 2016)
96. Photography Club "Sobytiye" (Omsk) – October 28, 2015 (the organization was shut
down – December 16, 2015)
97. Research and Information Center "Memorial" (St. Petersburg) – November 6, 2015
98. Baikal Environmental Wave (Irkutsk) – November 10, 2015 (the organization was shut
down – August 1, 2016)
99. Glasnost Defense Foundation – November 19, 2015
100. Human Rights Institute – November 20, 2015
101. Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North – November 27, 2015
102. Green World (Leningrad region) – December 2, 2015
103. Mashr (Republic of Ingushetia) – December 8, 2015
104. Woman's World (Kaliningrad) – December 11, 2015
105. Panorama Information and Research Center (Moscow) – December 18, 2015
106. Dauria Ecological Center (Chita) – December 30, 2015 (the organization
was shut down – September 1, 2016)
107. Yekaterinburg Memorial Society (Yekaterinburg) – December 30, 2015
108. Bureau of Public Investigations (Nizhny Novgorod) – January 14, 2016
109. Committee for the Prevention of Torture (Orenburg) – January 14, 2016
110. Institute of Forecasting and Resolving of Political Conflicts (Nizhny Novgorod) –
January 22, 2016
111. Ryazan Historical, Educational and Human Rights Center "Memorial" (Ryazan) –
February 1, 2016
112. Society of Assistance to Social Protection of Citizens "Peterburgskaya EGIDA"
(Saint Petersburg) – February 2, 2016 (the organization was shut down – April 26,
2016)
113. Center for Health and Social Support "SIBALT"  (Omsk) – February 15, 2016
114. Chelyabinsk Regional Organ of Public Independent Action "Ural Human Rights
Group" (Chelyabinsk) – February 15, 2016
115. Women of Eurasia (Chelyabinsk) – February 15, 2016
116. Ural Democratic Foundation (Chelyabinsk) – February 15, 2016
117. Legal and Social Support Charitable Foundation "Sphere" (Saint Petersburg) –
  March 1, 2016
118. Centre for Civic Education and Human Rights (Perm) – March 3, 2016
119. The International Development Fund for Indigenous Peoples of the
North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation "Batani" (Moscow) – March
11, 2016
120. Center for Social and Labor Rights  (Moscow) – March 21, 2016
121. Arkhar (Gorno-Altaysk) – April 5, 2016 (the organization was shut down –
October 6, 2016)
122. Publishing House "Valentin Manuylov" – April 15, 2016
123. Tengri School of Soul ecology (Altay) - May 17, 2016
124. Hanse Buero / Information Bureau of Schleswig-Holstein in Kaliningrad
(Kaliningrad) - May 24, 2016 (the organization was shut down – December 30, 2016)
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125. Krasnoyarsk Regional Public Organization «Agency of public initiatives»
(Krasnoyarsk) - May 27, 2016 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – September
21, 2016)
126. Saratov Regional Public Organization "Socium" (Engels) - May 30, 2016
127. Perm regional non-governmental organization "Perm Civil Chamber" (Perm) -
June 9, 2016 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – September 21, 2016)
128. Regional non-governmental organization Integration center "Migration and Law"
(Moscow) - June 16, 2016
129. Non-Profit Partnership “ESVERO” (Moscow) - June 22, 2016
130. Andrey Rylkov Foundation for Health and Social Justice (Moscow) - June 29,
2016
131. Altai regional sport and patriotic youth public organization "Arctica" (Biysk) - July
6, 2016 (“foreign agent” status was suspended – February 8, 2017)
132. Autonomous non-governmental organization "Free Word" (Pskov) - July 13, 2016
133. The Institute of Economic Analysis (Moscow) - July 22, 2016
134. Penza regional youth civic organization for prevention of negative phenomena
among youth "Panacea" (Kuznetsk) - August 15, 2016 (the organization was shut down
– December 8, 2016)
135. Samara regional, civic organization "American alumni club" (Samara) - August
26, 2016
136. Autonomous non-for-profit organization "Publishing house 'Park Gagarina'"
(Samara) - August 31, 2016
137. Levada Analytical Center (Moscow) - September 5, 2016
138. Environmental Watch on North Caucasus (Maikop) - September 13, 2016
139. Autonomous non-for-profit human rights organization "Draftee's school"
(Chelyabinsk) - September 21, 2016
140. Foundation for support of civil freedoms "Legal mission" (Chelyabinsk) -
September 21, 2016
141. International Historical, Educational, Human Rights And Charitable Society
Memorial (Moscow) - October 4, 2016
142. Sverdlovsk regional non-profit foundation "Health Era" (Ekaterinburg) - October
11, 2016
143. Chapaevsk non-profit organization "Chapaevsk city medical personnel
association" (Chapaevsk) - October 21, 2016
144. Regional charity foundation "Samarskaya gubernia" (Samara) - November 2,
2016
145. Non-profit partnership "Internet Community" (Samara) - December 13, 2016
146. Autonomous non-profit organization for social support "Project April" (Tolyatti) -
December 19, 2016
147. ANNA Centre for the prevention of violence (Moscow) - December 26, 2016
148. Southern Human Rights Centre (Sochi) - December 26, 2016
149. Sverdlovsk branch of the International Historical, Educational, Human Rights And
Charitable Society Memorial (Ekaterinburg) - December 29, 2016
150. SOVA Center for Information and Analysis (Moscow) - December 30, 2016
151. Sverdlovsk civic organization for assistance to legal migration "Nelegalov.Net [No
Illegals]" (Ekaterinburg) - January 10, 2017
152. Environmental human rights center Bellona (Saint Petersburg) - January 16,
2017
153. Youth civic organization "Pro-movement" (Altay region) - January 25, 2017
154. Kaliningrad regional civic organization "Society for German culture and Russian
Germans Eintracht - Soglasie" (Kaliningrad) - January 31, 2017
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155. Foundation for development assistance to mass communication and legal
education "Tak-Tak-Tak" (Novosibirsk) - February 20, 2017 (Human Rights Watch
2017.)
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Appendix 2: Three types of law by Nonet & Selznick
Repressive law Autonomous law Responsive law
Ends of law Order Legitimation Competence
Legitimacy Social defence
and raison d’état
Procedural
fairness
Substantive
justice
Rules Crude and
detailed but only
weakly binding on
rule makers
Elaborate; held to
bind rulers as well
as ruled
Subordinated to
principle and
policy
Reasoning Ad hoc; expedient
and particularistic
Strict adherence
to legal authority;
vulnerable to
formalism and
legalism
Purposive;
enlargement of
cognitive
competence
Discretion Pervasive;
opportunistic
Confined by rules;
narrow delegation
Expanded, but
accountable to
purpose
Coercion Extensive, weakly
restrained
Controlled by
legal restraints
Positive search
for alternatives
e.g., incentives,
self-sustaining
systems of
obligation
Morality Communal
morality; legal
moralism;
“morality of
constraint”
Institutional
morality; i.e.,
preoccupied with
the integrity of
legal process
Civil morality;
“morality of
cooperation”
Politics Law subordinated
to power politics
Law
“independent” of
politics;
separation of
powers
Legal and political
aspirations
integrated;
blending of
powers
Expectations of
obedience
Unconditional;
disobedience per
se punished as
defiance
Legally justified
rule departures,
e.g. to test validity
of statues or
orders
Disobedience
assessed in the
light of
substantive
harms; perceived
as raising issues
of legitimacy
Participation Submissive
compliance;
criticism as
disloyalty
Access limited by
established
procedures;
emergence of
legal criticism
Access enlarged
by integration of
legal and social
advocacy
(Nonet & Selznick 2001, 16)
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Appendix 3: Three types of formal organisations
Prebureaucratic Bureaucratic Postbureaucratic
Purpose Particularistic;
confusion of
private interests
and public
responsibilities
Explicit, fixed,
public; identified
by assigned
jurisdiction
Mission-oriented;
flexible
Authority Traditional,
charismatic,
unstructured
Hierarchically
subdivided
spheres of
competence;
communication
“though channels”;
formal rationality
Team and task
force organisation;
open
communication;
diffusion of
authority;
substantive
rationality
Rules Unsystematic Codified;
blueprints for
action; focus on
administrative
regularity
Subordinated to
purpose,
avoidance of rule-
boundedness
Decision
making
Ad hoc; subject to
whims of one-man
rule and to
uncontrolled
actions by
subordinates
Systematic;
routinized; limited
delegation;
assumption of
stable social world
composed of
elements readily
classified and
made subject to
rules
Participatory;
problem-centred;
broad delegation;
assumption of
environment
shifting
requirements and
opportunities
Careers Unstable,
nonprofessional;
offices available
for sale or as part-
time prizes for
elites
The official as full-
time professional
committed to the
organisation; no
personal
constituency;
appointment
based on merit;
emphasis on
seniority and
tenure
Multiple and
temporary
affiliations;
involvement
through sub-
contradicting;
experts have
autonomous
professional base
(Nonet & Selznick 2001, 22)
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Appendix 4: Statistics on public opinion of Russian people
(Social Distinctions in Modern Russia 2015).
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(Levada centre 2013, 91-93).
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Appendix 5: Statistics on the NGOs operating in North-West Russia
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Appendix 6: Questions for the interviews
Theme 1 – General discussion and background of the interviewee
How long have you been working for the non-governmental sector?
How long have you been working for this organisation where you work now?
What is your position in this NGO?
Theme 2 – History, changes and understanding NGO sector
Why and when was this organisation founded?
Has it changed a lot from since the beginning? Main changes?
Do you often have to explain to people who do not work for NGOs themselves
what you do for work/what your organisation does, or is it clear to them?
Have people had different ideas about what you do compared to what you
are/your organisation is actually doing?
What are the most common misunderstandings?
How would you describe the current state of Russian NGO field?
Theme 3 – Projects and importance
What do you think are you biggest achievements as an organisation?
What have been biggest setbacks/problems you have encountered?
Would you describe your work as political?
Theme 4 – Funding
Do you receive/have you received funding from the government?
Would you organisation be able to work without foreign funding?
Theme 5 – The changing legislation of NGOs in Russia
112
What have been the main changes in the Russian NGO legislation or
amendments to the legislation, which have affected the work of your
organisation?
In what ways has the legislation or new amendments changed the work of your
organisation?
Why do you think this legislation, or amendments to the legislation is being
introduced by the authorities?
Theme 6 – Future visions
What would be the most useful reform by the government for your organisation?
Where do you see your organisation in two years? What about in ten years?
Theme 7 - Final comments
Can you summarize, what is in your opinion the main problem with the Russian
NGO sector in 2015?
Do you have something you would like to add?
